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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL CHANGE IN
DEVELOPING SOCIETIES

The World Since World War II
The world since the end of World War II has seen the
struggle for independence by many of the former colonial states of
Africa, Asia, and Latin America. At the time of this writing, over
sixty previously dependent states have achieved sovereignty since
1945.

1

Today, one must look closely to find the last vestiges of the

great colonial empires.

Yet, with independence the leaders of these

new states are confronted with many pressing problems that heretofore
had been handled by the bureaucratic institutions of the colonial power.
These problems range from simply being able to provide basic
services to larger considerations such as the development of a
national foreign policy.

Fundamental to these problems is a larger,

more central issue, that of establishing a peaceful, orderly method
of transferring political authority and its accompanying aura of
legitimacy from one group in society to another.

1

It is an issue of

William G. Andrews and Uri Ra'anan, The Politics of the
coup d'etat (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1970), p. 1.
1
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crucial importance that the leadership must face if the new state is to
survive its first pangs of political development.

Indonesia: A Typical Developing Society
For the purposes of this paper, a developing society may be
viewed as a transitional stage in the evolution of a modern developed
industrialized state. Whereas a traditional society is based on a
sacred value system, manifested by an emphasis on custom and
tradition, a subsistance peasant economy, and a restrictive political
process and a modern society is one based on a predominately secular
value orientation with its accompanying emphasis on modern (i.e.,
western) economic and political institutions, a transitional society is
an environment in which the clash between sacred and secular has not
yet been resolved.

It is a society in which the pull of the past as well

as that of the future is still strong.
environment of inherent conflict.

Thus, a developing society is an

If the lure of modernity is strong

enough, the developing society will eventually evolve into a modern one.
This drilt toward modernity is by no means assured, however.

It is

entirely possible that the ties to the past (traditional society) will be
strong enough to prevent any modernizing movement to develop.

The

challenge for the leadership in such societies is to find a way to create
the best possible environment for their citizens while at the same time
reconciling the conflict between the two competing value systems.

....
3

In many regards, Indonesia is a typical developing society.
A state of 120 mi. ll ion inhabitants spread over 700, 000 square miles,
Indonesia was first brought into contact with the West by the Portugese
in 1511. The area came under Dutch hegemony in the early 1600's
when they supplanted the Portugese as the leading European power in
sea-girt Southeast Asia.
three centuries.

The Dutch ruled Indonesia for more than

Her rule was abruptly terminated in 1942 when

Japan seized control of the islands, driving the Dutch from the area.
Japanese control of the islands was short-lived, ending with her
defeat i.n World War II. Of major significance, however, was the fact
that during the latter stages of the Japanese occupation the military
governor summarily granted independence to Indonesia through a
native nationalist movement headed by the future president of Indonesia,
Sukarno.

This action was to take on added significance later when the

Dutch attempted to re-assert their influence in the area following
World War II. To the Dutch, the grant of independence made by the
Japanese was invalid because the Japanese had seized the area i.n
violation of international law.

The stage was therefore set for a crisis

i.n political change that was not resolved until December 1949 when the
Dutch, realizing the futility of their efforts, formally ceded sovereignty
to the Indonesians.

In August 1950, the unitary Republic of Indonesia,

with a western-style parliamentary system was proclaimed.

jiLi2
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The hi.story of Indonesia i.n the 1950's and early 1960's i.s the
story of the failure of western democratic tradi.ti.ons and the growing
concentration of poli.ti.cal power i.n the hands of one man, President
Sukarno.

This pattern of growing authori.tari.ani.sm was only checked

by the events of September 30 - October 1 , 1965.

These events and the

resulting cri.si.s i.n poli.ti.cal change form the bases of thi.s research.
As Luci.en Pye has pointed out, i.n non-western soci.eti.es the
poli.ti.cal sphere i.s

o~-ti.mes

and cultural environment.

2

not sharply di.fferenti.ated from the social
That i.s to say, many of the actions and

values of the political leadership i.n developing societies are shaped by
the socio-cultural environment out of which the political culture evolved.
Issues i.n the political sector may well be influenced by social confi.gurations permeating all aspects of life.

Thus, the concept of poli.ti.cal

change may be greatly affected by factors not manifestly related to the
poli.ti.cal process, but profoundly controlling i.t just the same.
Such i.s the case i.n Indonesia.

Indonesian society i.s

centered around the mystical values and rituals derived from the
ancient Javanese culture.

Certain cultural traits stand out i.n this

respect -- the fear of shame (loss of public esteem), conformity
ori.entati.on, and hi.erarchi.cal deference to i.ndi.viduals i.n posi.ti.ons of

2Lucien Pye, Southeast Asia's Poli.ti.cal Systems
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), vi.i..

pt
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authority.

Underlying all of Javanese society is the penchant for

misdirection or the desire to confront any problem obliquely rather
than in a direct manner.

It ts the contention of this research that this

typically Javanese reaction of misdirection (manifested artistically in
the classical Javanese art form, the wayang kulit or shadow play) was
employed by both contending parties in attempts to resolve the crisis in
political change that occurred as a result of the events of GESTAPU. 3

Purposes
Several ends are sought in this thesis.

First, it is intended

to serve as an introduction to Indonesia, a state that has the potential
to become a major Southeast Asian and world power.

By exploring

the roots of contemporary Indonesia, it is hoped that the reader will
gain an insight into a diverse, complex society that is sure to take on
added significance in the last quarter of the twentieth century.
Going beyond a cursory examination of Indonesian society,
however, this paper will also focus on a crucial relationship that exists
in any of the new states in the world today; namely, the institutional
role of the military in the political decision-making process.

In

developed (i.e., western) states there has been a long tradition of
non-participation by the military in matters political.

Historically,

3An acronym usually used to denote the attempted coup of
September 30 - October 1 , 1 965.

...
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this function has been reserved for the political institutions (political
parties, politicians, bureaucracies) in that society.

In developing

societies, however, this generally has not been the case.

Created

as a defensive institution by the colonial power, the military in a
developing society has generally received favored treatment in terms
of educational opportunities and budgetary considerations. Thus,
under the colonial administration the military institutions were often
stronger and more modern than any other institutions in society,
particularly the political ones. A basic source of conflict is thereby
established.
When the time for independence comes, the political leaders,
by the very nature of their activities, feel that the legitimacy to govern
should automatically devolve to them. The military leaders, on the
other hand, long accustomed to playing a dominant role in society,
feel otherwise; namely, that they, as the protectors of society, should
wield the predominant influence. This feeling on the part of the
military may be reinforced especially if the military was called upon
by the political institutions to aid them in the struggles for independence.

This was exactly the case in Indonesia in the late 1940's

as Sukarno and his PNI associates negotiated Indonesia's independence
at the conference table while General Nasuti.on was winning it in the
jungles of Central Java against the Dutch. The point to be made is
this: in developing societies, the military has become enmeshed in

p
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the political process.

Because of the role it played in winning the

independence, military men have tended to believe that they should
have a predominant voice in the political decision-making process.
Politicians, on the other hand, feel that military men lack the finesse
and expertise necessary in politics. Yet the desires of the military
must somehow be accommodated.

If their desire is blunted, a crisis

in political leadership may occur.

By tracing the role of the military

in pre-1965 Indonesian society, this research will isolate the factors
that led the military to intervene in the political decision-making
process in March, 1967.

It will serve as a· model of mi.litary-civi.lian

relationships and identify the variables that may disturb the precarious
balance between the two.

It is hoped that this thesis wi 11 generate valid

general izati.ons that can be utilized in a broader comparative study of
the role of the military in developing societies.
There is another, larger question to which this thesis will
ultimately address itself.

It is intended to be an examination of the

concept of political change in a developing society.

Institutionalized

political change is a key characteristic of a mature political system.
This was not the case in Indonesia during the period 1965 - 1967.
Indeed, upwards of one mi. lli.on people lost their lives i.n the bloodletting that followed the abortive 1965 coup attempt.

It was at this

juncture that the military felt compelled to enter the political arena.

p
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The purpose of this thesis is to explore the manner in which this
crisis in political change was resolved.
An integral component in the Indonesian experience was the
trials of suspected communist politicians and military men that took
place in the wake of the abortive coup attempt.

Each defendant was

selected because of his alleged proclivity for communist ideals and
also because of his relationship to the head of state, President Sukarno.
Operating in typically Javanese fashion, the military used these trials
to displace the civilian authorities by undermining their bases of
support in society.

By focusing on the trials to illustrate their central

role in the resolution of the crisis in political change that threatened
to destroy Indonesia during 1965 - 1967, it is hoped that this thesis will
aid in the understanding of the problems of developing societies,
particularly in the area of political change.

It is a subject that must

be considered if the gap between the developed and developing societies
is ever to be bridged.

Methodology
To this end, the following methodological construct is
proposed: the roots of the coup attempt will be explored with an eye
toward identifying the factors that prompted the confrontation; the
events of the coup will be analyzed, providing a background necessary
for a competent understanding of the trials; the trials of three

p
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prominent Sukarno subordinates will be examined to show how the
verdicts were virtually assured by the political climate of the times.
Finally, the trials will be placed 'into the context of the m'ilitary's
strategy for the displacement of Sukarno.

Comments on the signif-

icance of the trials as regards a model of political change 'in developing
societies will conclude the paper.

CHAPTER II

THE ACTORS

By the mtd-1960's, two factors were becoming increasingly
apparent to students of the Indonesian political scene. The first was
that President Sukarno was the dominant personality in Indonesia's
somewhat chaotic political situation, dwarfing any potential rivals.
Second, it was clear that Sukarno was able to maintain himself in
power through the delicate manipulation of the only two institutions
in society that could potentially challenge him; the military and the
Communist Party of Indonesia. 4 This chapter will look briefly at the
evolution of these factors with an eye toward ascertaining the motives
that prompted the crisis in political leadership that occurred on the
night of September 30 - October 1 , 1965.

The Military
Historically, the military of Indonesia has played an
important role in the development of the Indonesian nation-state.
The People's Security Army, founded in October, 1945, was the

4 Henceforth, the Communist Party of Indonesia will be

referred to as the PKI.
10

jiP
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fore-runner of the modern Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia.
It was the People's Security Army that waged the guerrilla campaign
against the Dutch after World War II. Thus, from its very inception,
the Indonesian military had played an integral part in the political
decision-making process.

Many military men felt that, because they

had fought for the state, they were entitled to a predominant voice in
state affairs.
The source of the officer corps in the Indonesian military is
varied.

Many of the officers received their training from the Japanese

during the occupation period. Other future officers were trained
overseas by the Dutch at the .Dutch Military Academy at Breda, the
Netherlands.

Sti. ll other future officers served in the independent

"lascar" units that operated against the Dutch or were recruited from
the student army that developed in response to the occupation period.
Generally speaking, the officers who began their careers in the years
of struggle against the Dutch were still in control of the military
structure in the mid-1960's. 5 They had grown accustomed to the
positions (and accompanying prestige) of political decision-making.
The hi.story of military-civilian relations in Indonesia
prior to the coup attempt of 1965 had been checkered at best. The

5 Guy J. Pauker, "The Military in Indonesia," The Role
of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, ed. John J. Johnson
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 217.

p
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development of the People's Security Army in 1945 had

le~

the country

with a military structure lacking any ideology upon which to base its
actions. As Daniel Lev has pointed out, the problem for the military
leadership prior to 1965 was to find a role for the military that would
satisfy its political, economic, and social aspirations. 6
The initial split between the military and civilian authorities
came on May 7, 1949 as a result of the Roem-von Royen Agreement
that ended guerrilla activities against the Dutch.

Military men

generally frowned on the decision while the politicians felt it to be the
most expendient course available. This conflict in military-civilian
relations was further exacerbated on October 17, 1952 over the questi.on of proposed civilian sponsored cut-backs in the military budget.
Throughout the early 1950's this pattern of military-civilian tension
manifested itself again and again until the Sumatran revolts of 1957-59
finally clarified the relationship.
Although it is beyond the scope of this research to become
involved in the history of the Indonesian civil wars, several implications warrant some examination. The first result of the SumatranSulawesi rebellions was that the most radical officers such as
Colonels Lubis, Simbolon, Husein, and Sumual were eliminated,

6

Daniel Lev, "The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia,"
Pacific Affairs, 34 (Winter, 1963-64), 348.

p
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thereby removing the extremist wing of the military.

Second, and far

more important, the military gained a stronger position vis-a-vis the
other national groups. As a result of the civil wars, the military
began to function as an administrative elite, running former Dutch
estates, imposing censorship, breaking up strikes, and banning
demonstrations. The culmination of this increased political activity
on the part of the military came when General A. H. Nasuti.on was
elevated to cabinet level in July, 1959.

In the period from the end of

the rebellion to the institutionalization of military rule, the prestige
and political authority of the military increased to the point that the
military became a cornerstone of the Indonesian political scene along
with Sukarno and the PKI.
When attempting to examine the relationship of the military
and civilian minds, one must naturally look at the ideological position
that underlies each position. This is particularly true of the military
mentality. The ideological make-up of the Indonesian military is
similar to that of most former colonial military structures. The
typical Indonesian officer is:
1.

More concerned with the warrior elan' than with
technical training.

2.

Strongly religious with a deep puritanical nature
concerning individual behavior.

3.

Deeply nationalistic with a great sense of xenophobia.

p
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4.

Introspective.

5.

Violently anti-communist.

(An exception must be noted

here. While this generalization holds true for the army
and navy, it does not apply to the Indonesian air force,
long the bastion of radical tendencies.)
6.

Firmly convinced that, because of the mi litary's role
in the struggles for independence, the military should
have a predominant role in the decision-making process
of the state .

7.

Unfamilar with, and in general opposition to, the
civilian mentality.

7

It must be remembered that these seven indices interact to create a
specific way of looking at the world. They cannot be isolated but must
be taken in totality. The value system of the Indonesian officer corps
must therefore be considered when viewing the military's reaction to
the political crisis of GESTAPU.

The Communist Party of Indonesia
Also gaining in strength and prestige during the early 1960's
was the Communist Party of Indonesia. The hi.story of the PKI is the

7 Morris Janowi.tz, The Military in the Political Development

of New Nations (Chicago:
pp. 48-71.

University of Chicago Press, 1964),
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story of a series of failures brought about by inept planning and poor
organizational strategy.

Founded on May 23, 1920 under the name of

Perserikatan Kommunist di India, the PKI takes its spiritual heritage
from the Indies Social Democratic Association, a group founded by
the radical Dutch socialist, H. J. F. M. Sneevliet. 8 The fledgling
communist party later changed its name to the Partai Komunis
Indonesia on June 7, 1924. The first chairman of the PKI was a
Sumatran, Tan Malaka, a cautious man more concerned with developing a sound base for the party than with overthrowing the existing
Dutch political institutions.

Because of his conservative approach to

politics, Tan Malaka was outvoted by his more militant colleagues in
1926 on the question of a proposed assault on the telephone/telegraph
buildings in the capital city of Batavia (later renamed Djakarta after
the termination of Dutch authority).

The attempt failed, setting in

8 Hendri.k Josephus Franciscus Marie Sneevliet, born
May 13, 1883, founded the Indies Social Democratic Association in
1914 to stir up nationalistic feelings in Indonesia. Previously a union
organizer in the Netherlands, Sneevliet mi.grated to the Indies in 1912.
After a split in the Social Democratic Association in 1917, Sneevli.et
emerged as the leader of the more revolutionary wing of the movement.
Because of his renewed interest in uni.on organizing, Sneevliet was
deported from Indonesia in 1917. Upon his return to Europe, Sneevliet
was associated for a ti.me with the Communist International. In 1929
he helped found the Revolutionary Socialist Party in the Netherlands.
He served as a parliamentary representative of that body from 1933
to 1937. Sneevliet was executed by the Germans on April 13, 1942.

p
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motion a program of repression so severe that Ruth McVey has said,
"this action put an effective end to communist activity in the Indies for
the remaining period of Dutch rule. 119 The crack-down following the
ill-fated assault netted 13,000 arrests and prompted the party to go
underground, not to re-emerge until 1935.

During the interim,

Tan Malaka, disenchanted with the party's lack of progress, split
from the PKI to form the Marxist-Leninist Party that operated out
of Bangkok.
The void in leadership during the period of enforced
seclusion was filled by Musso, a hard-liner favored by the Stalinist
regime in Moscow.

Under his leadership, a second attempt to over-

throw the government took place at Madiun, Central Java in September,
1948. Communist guerrilla units seized the city on September 18 and
held the area until the 30th when government forces retook the city,
executing Musso in the process. These 1948 rebellions were especially costly as 36,000 followers were arrested and executed,
including 11 top PKI leaders, five members of the Politburo among
them.

Once again the party was forced underground to regroup.
The significance of the ill-fated Madiun campaign goes

farther than a simple tactical error, however.

Granted, there was

9Robert Scalapino, The Communist Revolution in Asia
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), p. 276.
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a large loss of life at a ti.me when the PK! was desperately trying to
assert itself i.n Indonesian poli.ti.cal li.fe.

Even more important,

however, than thi.s loss of vi.tal personnel was the image of the PKI
that was created as a result of the abortive coup attempt.

In the eyes

of many Indonesians, the actions of the PKI, coming at a ti.me when
the Republic was fighting for i.ts poli.ti.cal life, were very treasonous.
Thi.s argument was gi.ven further credence when the PKI issued a bitter
denunci.ati.on of Sukarno aher the defeat at Madi.un.

Such an action

simply served to alienate even more persons who admired Sukarno as
the Father of the Indonesian Revolution.

Thus, in the eyes of many

Indonesians, the PKI became the symbol of disunity in Indonesian
politics.

This was an image that would remain for many years and

may even have been an underlying rationale for the bloody defeat of the
PKI in the mid-1960's.

In a country where concensus is paramount,

the PK! had earned the reputation as the exception to the normal
established order of things poli.ti.cal.
In 1950, the leadership of the party was assumed by
Dipa Nusantara Ai.di.t.

Widely acclaimed as a skillful organizer who

was more oriented toward Peking than Moscow i.n his ideological
persuasions, the youthful Ai.di.t (31 i.n 1950) presided over the resurgence of the PKI in the 1950's.

In 1955, the party won 16.4 percent

(6, 176,000 votes) of the votes for the Indonesian F arl i.ament.

This

p
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total placed them fourth with 39 out of the 257 contested seats. This
must be considered a remarkable showing in light of the demise of the
party following the debacle of 1948 just seven years prior. The party
was eagerly looking forward to the 1959 elections in hopes of gaining
even more support.

But these elections were never held due to the

insistance of the military and the capriciousness of President Sukarno.
By the mid-1960's, Aidit had built the PKI's membership to
three million.

In addition, about 14 million members were loosely

associ.ated through the PKI sponsored front organizations, such as,
the women's group, Gerwani, and youth grdup, Permuda Rakjat. To
do this, Aidit had to compromise his ideological purity.

He called for

non-interference with other parties' activities, pledged to cooperate
in various national fronts, and proclaimed a belief in the Panta Si.la,
Sukarno's amalgamation of religion, nationalism, humanism,
democracy, and social justice.
PKI was open to all.

He stated that membership in the

"The only thing we require," said Aidit, "is

1
that they must be patriots . " O
By the mid-1960's, the PKI had worked hard to gain
legitimacy as Sukarno's most faithful disci.ples.

They were so

successful that by mid-1965 it appeared as if Aidit would be named

10John Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval (New York:
David McKay Company, 1 967), p. 84.

19
Sukarno's political heir.

Speaking at the 45th anniversary celebration

of the PKI on May 23, 1965, Sukarno said, "Aidit is the bulwark of
Indonesia.

1111

It had been a difficult road from Batavia in 1926 through

Madiun in 1948 to that day.

Since 1950 the PKI had come to represent

as well a disciplined organization as there was in Indonesia. Thus, on
the eve of GESTAPU, the PKI was a threat to the only other highly
centralized organization in Indonesian society, the military. The
resulting conflict in political leadership was to re-affirm the superiority of the military yet one more time.

Sukarno
Sitting atop the Indonesian political environment and
thoroughly dominating it through his own unique brand of personal
politics was President Sukarno, Great Father of the Revolution. The
preface to Sukarno's autobiography aptly sums up the measure of the
man:
lover.

"The simplest way to describe Sukarno is to say he is a great
He loves his country, he loves his people, he loves women,

he loves art, and, best of all, he loves himself. 1112 Sukarno has
been called many things -- meglo-maniac, charmer, faddist.

11
12

As

Scalapino, The Communist Revolution in Asia, p. 279.

Donald Kirk, "Here Lies Bung Karno," New Leader,
April 10, 1967, p. 6.

p
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Donald Kirk has remarked, "Sukarno was the best speaker I ever
heard.
talent."

He could have been a movie star.
13

He had that kind of

Yet there is one thing that all experts agree on; that in

his every action, Sukarno was the manifestation of the classical
Indonesian mentality. A brief sketch of the man will reveal his
classical Javanese personality. To do so, the reader must seek the
roots of the Indonesian nationalist ideal which Sukarno came to
exemplify.
The Indonesian nationalism that surfaced

a~er

World War II

had its philosophical beginnings in the first quarter of the 20th century.
More specifically, Indonesian nationalism can be dated from 1908 when
a small group of Javanese medical students formed a society named
Boedi Oetomo (High Endeavor) to promote cultural ideas and educational reforms in response to the Ethical Policy of the Dutch instituted
around the turn of the century. At the same time, another group, the
Sarekat Dagang Islam, was established to protect Muslim cultural and
bus-lness expression against the growing overseas Chinese population
in Indonesia.

Some members of the Sarekat Islam also belonged to

the Social Democratic Association, the fore-runner of the PKI. Thus,
when the PKI was crushed

a~er

its futile coup attempt of November,

1926, the Sarekat Islam movement was also doomed to extinction. To

13Ibid., p. 9.
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fill the intellectual voi.d left by the destruction of the PKI and the
Sarekat Islam, a number of student study groups were formed.
One of these groups, based in Bandung, was headed by a young
East Javanese civil engineer, Sukarno. 14
Sukarno was born in 1901, the son of a Javanese school
teacher and a Balinese dancer.

As a boy of fourteen, he was sent

to live as a foster son in the home of 0. S. Tjokroaminoto, a former
prominent leader of the Sarekat Islam movement.

During hi.s stay

i.n Tjokroami.noto's home, Sukarno acquired many of his radical
views on nati.onali.sm.

There can be no doubt that this period had a

profound effect on the young impressionable Sukarno.
In 1927, when he was twenty-six years old, Sukarno helped
found the Nationalist Party of Indonesia (PNI).

The PNI was to become

Sukarno's mouthpiece i.n his rise to prominence during the struggles
for independence in the late 1940's.

While there were several other

nationalist groups operating i.n Indonesia at the ti.me (notably the
Nahdatul Ulama, a Muslim group), i.t was the PNI that ultimately was
to become the leading spokesman for the Indonesian cause.

This was

14sukarno's father, a teacher, long desired his son to
be a "servant of the fatherland." Because of his fluency i.n Dutch,
Sukarno was admitted to the European Elementary School in
Modjokerto. In 1916 he advanced to the "high school" in Surabaya.
Sukarno's education continued upon his admission into the Institute
of Technology in Bandung i.n 1920. He graduated i.n 1926 with an
advanced degree i.n engineering.
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probably due to Sukarno's great personal magnetism, which even at
this early stage in his career, was his major asset.
In 1 929, Sukarno was arrested by the Dutch because of his
nationalist activities.
sentence.

He served two years of a possible three-year

This pattern of arrest and imprisonment by the Dutch was

to continue throughout the 1930's.
again and exiled to Sumatra.

In 1933, Sukarno was arrested

It was during this confinement that

Sukarno established personal relationships with many men who were
destined to become his associates in government.

Among his cell-

mates was Mohammed Hatta, who was to serve as Vice-President
from 1949 to 1956 when he resigned over a petty dispute with Sukarno.
If the anti-Dutch agitations of the 1920's and 1930's had
planted the seeds of discontent, it was the Japanese occupation that
allowed the Indonesian nationalist movement to blossom.

At the time

of the initial take-over, Japanese officials rounded up and incarcerated
all potential Indonesian political dissidents.
arrested and detained.

Sukarno was among those

By using flattery, gi le, and calculated ri.sks,

Sukarno was able to gain acceptance to the inner circle of Japanese
authority to the extent that when the Japanese declared Indonesia a
free republic on August 17, 1945, he was in a position to be named
president of the new state.

This was an office he was destined to hold

unti.l post GESTAPU events forced him from office on March 12, 1967.
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While Sukarno's formal educational experiences had taught
him the sharp dichotemy between eastern and western value systems,
he was no ordinary intellectual rebel.

15

From his earliest days,

Sukarno was constantly driven by his desire for Indonesians to reach
social parity with the white (western) world.

Indeed, much of

Sukarno's personal appeal wi.th the Indonesian masses can be gleaned
from his anti-colonial attitudes.

Sukarno regarded himself not only

as the founder of the Indonesian state, but as the very personification
of anti-westernism as well.

Not long after the announcement of

"Guided Democracy," Sukarno declared,
I belong to that group of people who are bound in spiritual
longing by the romanticism of the revolution. I am inspired
by it. I am fascinated by it. I am completely absorbed by it.
I am crazed, I am obsessed by the romanti.ci.sm of revolution.
That is why I, who have given the topmost leadership in the
struggles of the Indonesian nation, never ti.re of appealing
and exhorting: Solve our national problems in a revolutionary
way, make the revolutionary spirit surge on, see to it that the
fire of our revolution does not die or grow dim, not even for a
single moment. Come, then, keep fanning the flames of the
leaping fire of revolution. Brothers and sisters, let us become
16
logs to feed the flames of revolution!
In the days before GESTAPU, such fiery rhetoric was not lost on the
Indonesian people.

15Kirk, "Here Lies Bung Karno," p. 8.
16 Robert Shaplen, Time Out of Hand (New York:
Harper & Row, 1970), p. 65.
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In many ways, Sukarno's style paralleled that of the 1960's
civil rights leaders who taught their followers to reject white society
and glorify their own history.

Indeed, some writers feel that

Sukarno's greatest contribution to Indonesia was his resentment of
the Dutch in particular and the Western ideal in general.

Touching on

this subject in his autobiography, Sukarno commented, "The Dutch
children never played with native children.

They were the good, the

pure, the snow-white Westerners and they looked down on me because
I was a native or 'inlander. 11117 It was such a frame of mind that
Sukarno brought to the political leadership of Indonesia in the years
before 1965.
It is only at this point that the tragic flaw in the man's
personality appears.

It is indeed ironic that even while Sukarno

openly worked against the ways of the West, he really yearned to be
like Westerners.

He drove western cars.

western fashions.

He dressed in the latest

He entertained in western style.

When questioned

about his life-style, Sukarno rationalized, "I reacted to the poverty
and tragedy in which I was brought up in.

I like my pleasures, I have

earned them." 18 It was this inner contradiction that was to destroy
Sukarno in the wake of GESTAPU.

17Kirk, "Here Lies Bung Karna," p. 7.
18Jb"d
l
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During the late 1950's and early 1960's, a sense of creeping
authoritarianism could be noticed in Sukarno's actions.

By this time,

Sukarno felt that what was needed was not a chaotic parliamentary
system which had no basis in either Indonesian thought or tradition,
but a strong bapak (father fi.gure) to draw the country together.
1 957, Sukarno was ready to put his plans into action.

By

In February of

that year, Sukarno announced his desire to return to the old 1945
executive oriented constitution.

At the same ti.me, he introduced his

"Guided Democracy" which would assure the chief executive (Sukarno
as President) strong central power and offer an alternative to the
western democratic, i.e. , imperialist tradition.

In 1959, Sukarno

further consolidated hi.s position by di.ssolvi.ng the elected parliament
and instituting a gotong royong (mutual cooperation) assembly of his
own choosing.

This trend toward concentration of power reached its

zenith in 1963 when Sukarno was named President For Life.

By this

date it was apparent that democracy, in the western sense of the word,
had become a dead issue in Indonesia.
If Sukarno can be said to have given Indonesia a sense of
unity i.n the years before 1965, i.t can also be said that he was the
indirect cause of the crisis in political leadership that occurred i.n that
year.

Because of hi.s penchant for high li.vi.ng, by the mi.d-1960's

Sukarno was in serious ill-health.

It was widely felt that his demise

would touch off a violent struggle for power among the only two forces

p
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in society capable of assuming control, the military and the PKI.
There was no legal line of succession because the Vice-Presidency,
vacant since Hatta's resignation in 1956, had never been filled.
Furthermore, Sukarno had given little indication of his preference
of an heir apparent. Thus, the classic struggle for political power
between the military and civilian mentalities was joined.

Both

contending parties knew the consequences should the other gain the
upper hand.
The question of a legal successor to Sukarno became a
moot point, however, because on the night of September 30 -October 1,
1965, Lt. Col. Untung, battalion commander of Sukarno's bodyguards,
attempted a coup d'etat that was destined to change forever the course
of Indonesian politics.
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CHART SUMfv1ARIZING THE DECLINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY IN THE INDONESIA REPUBLIC

August 1 945
The Japanese surrender. Dr. Sukarno proclaims the
independent Republic of Indonesia before the return of the Dutch
colonial power.
September 1948
An uprising of the Indonesian Communist Party
(PKI) is quelled.
December 1949 After two "police actions" against the nationalists,
the Dutch finally concede sovereignty to Indonesia, but leave
open the question of the future ownership of Dutch West New
Guinea.
1950
Indonesia adopts a Western-style parliamentary constitution.
1951-1953
An uprising of the fanatical "Darul Is lam" movement
gains momentum in protest against President Sukarno's failure
to make Indonesia an Islamic state.
September 1955
General elections. Nationalist, Muslim, and
Communist parties dominate the parliament.
February 1957
Sukarno proposes to introduce "Guided Democracy"
to give the executive strong central power and as an alternative
to Western democratic practice.
December 1957
In his campaign to wrest Dutch West New Guinea
("West Irian") from The Hague, Sukarno breaks off diplomatic
relations with Holland, expels all Dutch subjects, and begins
appropriating all Dutch interests.
February 1958
Regional military commanders rebel in Sumatra,
where a "Revolutionary Government of the Republic of
Indonesia" is declared.
1959-1960
Sukarno announces his "Political Manifesto," which
is the basic document of "Guided Democracy," and becomes
head of government as well as head of state.
Sukarno dissolves the elected parliament and replaces it
with a gotong royong (mutual cooperation) assembly of his own
choosing and subordinated to his authority. The new policy of
NASAKOM (cooperation between Nationalists, religious parties,
and Communists) is confirmed •
February 1960
Khrushchev visits Indonesia.
1961
The Sumatra rebellion peters out. Indonesian troops begin
infiltrating "West Irian" to harass the Dutch.
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1962

The New York agreement gives Indonesia provisional control
of West Irian under the aegis of the United Nations but stipulates
that the population must be granted their own "Act of Free
Choice" in 1969.
The Darul Islam revolt is finally suppressed.

September 1963
Sukarno launches serious military "Confrontation"
against the new expanded Federation of Malaysia.
January 1965
Sukarno takes Indonesia out of the UN in protest
against the admission of Malaysia.
September-October 1965
An abortive Communist coup in Indonesia
i.s followed by a widespread massacre of Communists by the
military and the Muslims.
1966
Muslim youth movements organize massive demonstrations
against Sukarno, the Communists, and the Chinese. General
Suharto assumes effective power.
June-September 1966
Confrontation is ended by signed agreement.
Indonesia rejoins the UN.
February-March 1967
Suharto officially becomes acting president.

CHAPTER III

THE COUP THAT FAILED

The Rumours
In the days before GESTAPU, Indonesia was besieged
by rumours of plots and counterplots having varying i.deologi.cal
persuasions.

One rumour, widely circulated by communist party

press organs, told of a purported "Council of Generals" that would
stage a right-wing coup on Armed Forces Day (October 5).

The

avowed purpose for the take-over, according to the communists,
was to destroy the PKI and solidify the posi.ti.on of the military i.n the
Indonesian political picture.

At the same time, it was alleged that

Aidit had pressed Sukarno to create a "fifth force" of armed peasants
and workers to act as a countervai. lent to the growing power of the
mi. l i.tary. 1 9 In a speech on January 17, 1965, Ai.di.t revealed,
"I have submitted a proposal to President Sukarno to arm immediately
the workers and peasants, the pillars of the revolution.

No less than

19when Sukarno challenged Army Chief of Staff Yani. on
the existence of a "Council of Generals," he was told that i.t was
merely a group of senior officers who met from ti.me to ti.me to
discuss "political matters" and some internal Army affairs mainly
having to do with promotion and retirement of senior officers.
29
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five million organized workers and ten million organized peasants are
ready to take up arms. 1120 Such a statement was clearly a challenge
to the military' s position of dominance in society.

General Sutopo

Juwono, director of the Army's intelligence division, stated the
military's position when he said,
Our feeling at the ti.me was that if the fifth force was set up,
the Army -- the armed forces -- would be separated from the
people and we would end up with a dual command. We considered the proposal an outside effort, especially by Peking and the
PKI, to divide the Army from the people. 21
Even at this early point the lines of confrontation were becoming
apparent.

In addition, Sukarno's continued physical demise and the

arrival of a team of communist Chinese doctors lent plausibility to the
suspicion of an externally inspired communist plot.

It was rumoured

that these Chinese acupuncture specialists reported Sukarno's condi.ti.on directly to Ai.di.t. 22 Indeed, on the eve of the coup attempt
Sukarno's health had become a political football.

Sukarno scoffed at

any suggestion of an attempt to di.sp lace him. 23

20The proposed "fifth force" would be an alternative to the
four regular branches of the Indonesian military -- army, navy, air
force, and marines.
21 Scalapi.no, The Communist Revolution in Asia, p. 291 •
22shaplen, Time Out of Hand, pp. 94-95.
23when told of the rumours, Sukarno dismissed them as
"PKI phobia" or "psychological warfare" aimed at sidetracking the
"revolutionary spirit."
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The Strategy of the Plotters
Despite the President's denials, the coup attempt of
September 30 - October 1, 1965 followed a highly i.ntri.cate plan.
plotters,

le~-wtng

The

members of the military supported by communist

front organizations, notably the women's and youth organi.zati.ons,
chose Halim ai.rfteld outside Djakarta as their base of operations.

The

commandant of the base, Major Sujono, as well as the Ai.r Force Chief
of Staff Dhani were among the plotters.
H- Hour for the coup attempt was to be 4:00 a. m.,
October 1, 1965.

It was hoped that the coup forces would be able to

achieve their objectives before morning thus negating any reaction
from opposing forces.

Thi.s coup force was di.vi.ded i.nto three groups,

each with a specific objective to be achieved.

The names of the attack

forces were derived from mystical characters in the classical
Javanese shadow play, the wayang kuli.t.

The Pasupati., composed of

Untung's Tjakrabi.rwa palace guards and Permuda Rakjat (youth group)
trainees, was given the task of seizing the top command of the military.
A list of eight generals was supplied.

24

The murder squads were to

24The eight officers included: General Nasuti.on, Minister
of Defense, General Yant, Army Chief of Staff, Major General
Parman, Intelligence Di.vision, and staff officers, Major General
Suprapto, Major General Harjono, Bri.gi.di.er General Pandijaitan,
Bri.gi.di.er General Siswomi.hardjo, and Brigidier General Sukendro.
The plotters failed to realize that Sukendro was out of the country
at the ti.me of the coup.
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either capture or kill these selected members of the military high
command. Those on the list were either killed at their residences,
on the way to Halim, or at the base itself. Their bodies were buried
in a remote section of the airfield. 25 The Bimasakti, composed of
visiting Central and East Javanese battalions in Djakarta for the
Armed Forces Day celebration, had the objective of capturing and
holding the Presi.denti.al Palace, radio station, and telecommunications
center on Merdeka Square. A reserve force, the Gatot Katja (ai.r
force and youth groups) remained on ready alert at the airfield. At
the appointed hour, unmarked troop convoys rolled into the streets of
Djakarta.

Reaction and Defeat
When news of the coup attempt reached President Sukarno
on the morning of October 1, four options were considered as vi.able
alternatives to insure his safety against the plotters. 26

First, he

25Photographs of the bodies of the murdered generals
discovered after the defeat of the coup, helped inflame military
sentiment against the PKI.
26Qn the night of the coup, Sukarno drove first to Senayan,
a suburb of Djakarta to address one of the "functional groups" that sat
in the Parliament. After the speech he returned to the Presidential
Palace only long enough to change clothes before driving to the Hotel
Indonesia to pick up his Japanese wife, Dewi., who had been attending
a wedding reception. They then drove together to
res1
in
Slipi where Sukarno spent the night.
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could go to a "well situated house" i.n the Djakarta suburb of
Kebajoram.

This was the residence of one of his wives.

27

Second,

he could put out to sea on a vessel of the still loyal Indonesian navy.
This alternative would totally remove him from physical danger and
also make any escape more feasible.

Opting to remain i.n the country,

Sukarno could choose to travel to the Presidential Palace at Boger
approximately forty miles from Djakarta vi.a an armoured car.

The

last option was for Sukarno to go to the rebel stronghold at Halim
and openly "confront" the plotters.

In a fateful decision that would

ultimately cause hi.s political downfall, President Sukarno chose this
last alternative.

0. G. Roeder sees thi.s deci.si.on as the tragic flaw

in Sukarno's actions at this ti.me.

"If Sukarno had gone to the palace

he would have been in a position to si.de either with Untung or Suharto
or to play one against the other. 1128 However, for reasons known only
by Sukarno, he opted for the tri.p to Halim.
The plotters, now calling themselves the Revolutionary
Council of Indonesia issued their first radio communique at 7: 15 a. m.

27 Over the course of hi.s lifetime, Sukarno was rumoured
to have been married 18 times. At the time of the coup he had five
wives (one more than the legal Muslim limit). Si.nee each of his
wives had her own establishment, he always had a wide choice of
accommodations •
2 8 Arnold C. Brackman, The Communist Collapse i.n
Indonesia (New York: W. W. Norton and Compan
p. 86.
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on the morning of the fi.rst. 29 In this initial message, the plotters
stated that the purpose of the coup had been to smash the reactionary
"Council of Generals" who themselves had planned a coup for
October 5, Armed Forces Day.

After pledging to work for the good

of the Indonesian people, the communique concluded with a list of
some fifty prominent military and civilian leaders who allegedly
supported the actions of the September 30th Movement, the group
claiming responsibili.ty for the coup. 30
It was only at this point that President Sukarno broke his
silence on the unfolding drama.

When viewing his actions in retro-

spect, hi.s behavior was curious indeed.

On the evening of the first,

Sukarno issued a Presidenti.al Order of the Day. 31

Along with the

expected call for calm and increased vigilance on the part of the
citizenry, Sukarno chose this moment to appoint Major General
Pranoto Reksosamudro as acting commander-in-chief of the Army.
The urgent questi.on is this -- unless Sukarno knew that Yani had been
on the list of officers to be executed by the Pasupati, why did he need

2

9-rhe communique is included in its entirety in the
appendix to this paper.
30

It is interesting to note that many of the people included
on the list later said they were never consulted or gave permission to
use their names in the statement.

31The text of the Presidential Order is included in the
appendix to this paper.
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to appoint a new commandant at this crucial juncture? The timing of
this announcement would be crucial later as the military attempted to
prove Sukarno's prior knowledge and involvement in the abortive coup.
As will be recalled, one group of the coup force (the
Bimasakti) was to gain control of essential communications centers
located in the heart of Djakarta along Merdeka Square.

During the day

following the take-over (October 1) loyal government forces of the
Kostrad (Strategic Reserve) under General Suharto negotiated with the
plotters holding the square.

By using threats and appeals to nation-

alism as a basis, by the end of the day Suharto was able to persuade
these troops to capitulate and release their hold on the vital communications facilities.

Having now driven a wedge in the organization of

the coup forces, Suharto now began to evolve a counter-coup strategy
that aimed at defeating the conspirators.
With the coup in a state of precarious balance, the PKI
created a massive blunder that ultimately provided the documentary
justification for the party's own obliteration at the hands of the military.
The PKI sponsored daily newspaper, the Harian Rakjat endorsed the
coup attempt in an editorial in its October 2, 1965 edition. Accom.panied by a cartoon of two generals with dollar signs for epaulettes,
shoulder badges of the "Council of Generals" and caps with the letters,
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"C. I .A." propped up by an evil-looking Uncle Sam, the Harian Rakjat
editorial read as follows:
It has happened that on the 30th of September measures
were taken to safeguard President Sukarno and the Republic
of Indonesia from a coup by a so-called Council of Generals.
According to what has been announced by the September 30th
Movement, which is headed by Lieutenant Colonel Untung of
a Tjakrabirwa battalion, action taken to preserve President
Sukarno and the Republic of Indonesia from the Council of
Generals is patriotic and revolutionary.
Whatever the justi. fication that may have been used by the
Council of Generals in its attempt, the staging of a coup is a
condemnable and counter-revolutionary act.
We the people fully comprehend what Lieutenant Colonel
Untung has asserted in carrying out his patriotic movement.
But whatever the case may be, this is an internal army
affair. On the other hand, we the people, who are conscious
of the policies and duties of the revolution, are convinced of
the correctness of the action taken by the September 30th
Movement to preserve the revolution and the people.
The sympathy and support of the people is surely on the
side of the September 30th Movement. We call on the people
to intensify their vigilance and be prepared to confront all
eventualities. 32
Thus, in an incredibly ill-advised move, the PKI sealed its own fate
by tying itself forever to the actions of the September 30th Movement.
Meanwhile, after regaining control at Merdeka Square,
Suharto planned his counter-attack against the plotters headquartered
at Halim field.

In the early hours of October 2, Suharto's Kostrad

troops moved against the now disorganized plotters at the airfield.
The coup attempt was defeated by 6: 10 a. m. on the morning of the

32Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval, p. 78.
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second as Suharto's forces retook the area with no casualties.
Commenting later on the action, Suharto said,
I gave top priority to avoiding bloodshed. I could have
seized the radio station early in the morning. But this would
have resulted i.n shooting and at that time I still did not know
the real background of the September 30th Movement. Once
the announcement of the Revolutionary Council and i.ts composition had been made, their real activities were unmasked,
convincing us that we no longer need hesitate to take action
against the September 30th Movement. 33
The remnants of the September 30th Movement, now more aptly called
a retreat, were pursued into the rural areas beyond Djakarta. Within
a few days loyal government troops had either regained control or
neutralized the rebel elements. The real blood-letting was yet to come.
The defeat of the coup attempt exposed the flaws in the
plotters' strategy. The failure of the Bimasakti to hold the communications center allowed word of the coup attempt to be conveyed to loyal
government troops throughout Indonesia. The failure to kill General
Nasution provided a symbolic rallying point for the counter-coup forces.
The plotters made a fundamental error when they failed to regard
Suharto as a potential threat.

By ignoring him, the plotters allowed

him to operate with a relatively free hand until he, not they became
the master of the situation.

Most importantly, the plotters failed to

gauge accurately the public mood of the citizenry of Indonesia. The

331 bid . ' p . 72 .
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plotters felt that the coup would be the signal for a spontaneous
reaction among the masses.

This did not happen.

As the Sultan of

Jogjakarta, now a prominent figure in the government of Suharto,
explained, "There was no popular uprising of the people." The
communists, he said, misjudged the temper of the people. 34 The
PKI had become a mass party that lacked any support of the masses.
Indeed, the defeat of the coup was to signal something quite the
opposite than what the plotters had intended.

34

Brackman, The Communist Collapse in Indonesia, p. 140.

CHAPTER IV

THE BLOODY AFTERJ\;1,A.TH OF GESTAPU

The defeat of the coup attempt signaled the beginning of a
massive reign of terror in Indonesia.

The military, now wearing the

hero's laurels due to Suharto's defeat of the purported communist
coup, was enraged over Sukarno's failure to denounce the PKI and its
role in the aborted take-over.

35

Photographs of the slain generals'

mutilated bodies buried at Halim further served to accentuate the
growing rift between the military and civilian mentalities.

Further

fuel was added to the budding controversy when Sukarno failed to
appear at a memorial service honoring the murdered officers.

The

sight of General Nasution on crutches at the ceremonies, evoked a
strong emotional response that was not lost on the military men
attending the rites.

36

In retrospect, Sukarno's failure to attend the

function must be viewed as a fundamental error on his part if he

35

1n the days immediately following the coup attempt,
Sukarno never made any reference to the role of the PKI in the
take-over attempt.
36

General Nasution injured his foot while fleeing the
squads on the night of the coup attempt.
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wished to remain in control of the political system.

It was at this time

that the military announced creation of a "Combined Action Body for
Crushing the September 30th Movement." This organization was a
concerted attempt to unite all anti-communist sentiment explicitly
against the PKI. The fact that many overseas Chinese residing in
Indonesia were also victims of the purge implied the military's belief
of complicity on the part of the Chinese communists.

Indeed, one of

the first actions of the mob (notably anti-communist Muslim student
groups) was to attack the embassy of the People's Republic of China.
The motives for the blood-letting were varied. To the
military, the need was to eliminate the PKI as a contending political
force.

To this end, military units stood idly by as mobs attacked and

destroyed the PKI headquarters in Djakarta. The homes of Aidit and
other leading PKI figures were looted and burned.

Slogans such as

"Crush Aidit" or "Crush the PKI" began to appear with regularity on
the walls and billboards of the city.

More importantly, there were

few, if any, arrests of vandals during this period.

When criticized

for their inaction during the disturbances, the military rationalized,
"It was the communists or us.

If we hadn't killed them, they would

have killed us. 1137

37Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval, p. 189.
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To the Muslim religious groups, the killings took on a
mystical religious connotation. This was particularly true in the outer
islands.

East Java provides a classic example.

In this area, most of

the executions were by beheading. The bodies were buried in one
grave, the head in another.

This action satisfied the local belief that

decapitation and separate burial prevented the spirits of the dead
victim from returning to haunt the slayers. 38 In other areas as well,
the patterns of killing reflected deep divisions of race, religion, and
culture.
To the student groups, notably the radical university student
group, the KAMI, the purges were an expression of a nationalistic
fervor to drive out the overseas Chinese.

For many years, the resi-

dent Chinese aliens had assumed a predominant position in the
Indonesian economic structure. Although numbering only three million
in 1965, the overseas Chinese controlled over 70 percent of the
"native" industries. The student groups felt that the purges offered
an opportunity to redress this situation.

Indeed, the militant student

groups were later to become the most vocal critics of the military
when the military sought to wind down the purge.

38

s. S. King, "Great Purge of Indonesia," New York Ti.mes
Magazine, May 8, 1966, p. 28.
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To the average man in the street, however, the motive was
much simpler; the killings were rationalized on the basis of selfdefense.

It was a simple matter of kill or be killed. As one of

Indonesia's best known artists, Antonio Blanco has remarked, "Every
night we could see one village after another go up in flames.

We were

tn deathly fear of our own lives. 1139 Another Balinese resident, a
Dutc.h woman, said, "Everyone got the blood lust. At night, sleeping
with guns under our pillows, we found ourselves saying, 'Why don't
they kill that man instead of this one? 11140
Internationally, world reaction to the events in Indonesia
varied.

The United Nations made no official statement.

Neither did

many of the non-aligned countries. The communist world (Moscow
and Peking) viewed the passing of the largest communist party in
Southeast Asta with a cautious sorrow.

P ravada conceded the

"possibility" that a PKI "adventurist" clique "may" have been involved.
The Chinese were more outspoken.

Calling the crimes "heinous and

deliberate ... unprecedented in history," the Chinese condemned the
Indonesian military for its handling of the situation. 41

(In retrospect,

this may be viewed more of an attack along ethnic lines than ideological

39

shaplen, Time Out of Hand, p. 129.

40 Ibid., p. 129.
41
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ones.

Recall that the overseas Chinese were prime targets of the

purge.) The West treated the situation lighter than it would the
genocide in Biafra in 1968. While several publications 42 ran feature
articles on the events in Indonesia, the United States government
never officially commented on the situation.
Statistics on the number of persons killed during the purge
varied according to the source consulted.
figure around one million.
to 500,000.

The Economist set the

The Washington Post reduced this figure

Life magazine calculated 400,000 casualties while the

New York Times estimated from 150,000 to 400,000 victims.

In a

speech before his death in 1970, Sukarno set the figure at 87, 000.
The real figure will never be known.
At this point, an assessment of the impact of GEST APU
and its bloody aftermath must be made.

The economy of Indonesia,

already weak before 1965, was pushed past the breaking point.

The

cost to Indonesia, both directly in terms of actual expenditures and
indirectly in terms of lost foreign aid (once in a fit of pique over the
United States' refusal to send Indonesia any further foreign aid because
of his anti-Malaysia policy, Sukarno told the United States to "go to
hell with your aid") was tremendous.

The political process was a

42Major publications with articles on Indonesia included
the Times of London, Guardian, and Saturday Review.
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shambles.

Any sense of constitutional legitimacy had been destroyed

by Sukarno's constant usurpation of power during the late 1950's.
Political organizations of varying persuasions had been systematically
outlawed and their leaders jailed to the extent that the concept of
democratic choice was a mere illusion in Indonesia.

Political authority

was now based on the monopoly of the instruments of violence.
Socially, Indonesia was a nation caught up i.n a massive witch
hunt aimed at eradicating a philosophy alien to the Indonesian mentality.
It was a situation that pitted neighbor against neighbor in a struggle
that threatened to destroy the very concept of the Indonesian nation.
Even more important, however, was the fact the GESTAPU had created
a cerebral gap in the Indonesian mind.
nuity had been shattered.
longer.

Any sense of ideological conti-

Nationalism seemed to have no meaning any

Marxism had apparently been violently repudiated.

Even the

personalism of President Sukarno, long a source of security for the
average Indonesian, was now in serious doubt.

Students of the

Indonesian experience have never found any document

le~

by the PKI

describing the nature of the character a Marxist Indonesia would have
taken had the coup been successful.
essence.

One can only speculate on its

In light of this situation, the mantle of political legitimacy

was there for the taking by the first group that could claim to speak for
the masses of Indonesia.

It would not remain unclaimed for long.

CHAPTER V

THE TRIALS AND SUKARNO - I

It was in this atmosphere of emotional reaction to GESTAPU
that the military announced the trials of suspected conspirators in the
coup attempt.

The defendants selected for prosecution were either

members of the now discredited PKI or left-wing officers in the
military. The defendants were to stand trial before a mahmi llub
(military tribunal) composed solely of highly ranking military
.
43
off1cers.
The attorneys for the state were also members of the
army's legal division.

Foreign newsmen were barred from the pro-

ceedings, making Antara, the official government news agency, the
only source of information about the trials.

Thus, the military was

to be in complete control of this attempt to resolve the crisis in
political leadership that was threatening to tear Indonesia apart.
The verdicts were foregone conclusions.

44

The significance

of the trials, therefore, was not the verdicts rendered but the way in

43

of the nine jurists on the tribunal, none were civilians.

44The loudest critics were the student groups who viewed
the trials merely as attempts to cover up the real role of Sukarno.
45

46
which the mi.li.tary used the proceedings to discredit President Sukarno
by linking him to the plotters in a superior-subordinate relationship.
The military was forced to employ such tactics in the days immediately
following the coup attempt because Sukarno was still enormously
popular with the majority of Indonesian citizens. As one young professor at the University of Indonesia said, "We need Sukarno. They
(the people) idolize him. What are they going to do if they hear we've
thrown him out? They might even start fighting for him. 1145 Statements such as these were indicative of the mood of the people. A direct
confrontation at this delicate juncture might have ended in defeat for the
military. Operating in typical Javanese fashion, the military evolved
its plan of indirect attack against the government of Bung Karno.

The Early Trials
In the early trials, the military moved cautiously, selecting
minor personalities.

It was hoped that these early trials would set the

stage for Sukarno's repudiation without having to confront him directly.
Njono, a PKI labor front leader and the coordinator of the youth groups
at Halim during the coup attempt was tried and sentenced to death
in February, 1966.

He was to be the first individual to be legally

punished for the events of September 30 - October 1, 1965.

45
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trial, Njono repeatedly said the PKI had staged the revolt in order to
keep a "group of army generals" from seizing power. 46 Just as the
Harian Rakjat editorial had implicated the PKI, the testimony given
at the Njono trial tended to re-enforce the military's contention that
the PKI was behind the take-over attempt.

With Sukarno's close

relationship to the PKI a known fact, these were potentially damaging
revelations .
Lt. Col. Untung, the commander of the palace guards and
alleged mastermind of the coup attempt, had fled Djakarta in the last
hours of the coup.

A~er

an extensive search, he was captured in

Central Java on October 11, 1965.

He went on trial on February 23,

1966. Throughout the proceedings, the prosecution tried to create
an image of Untung as an ambitious, gullible man who was willing to
become a dupe of the PKI in exchange for personal aggrandizement.
Untung's only line of defense was that he had acted to thwart a
"Council of Generals.

1147

He was found guilty and sentenced to death

on March 7, 1 966. The sentence was carried out in a military prison
in West Java on September 28, 1967.

46
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During mid-1966 more guilty verdicts were handed down.
Lt. Ngadimo, a communist army officer was sentenced to death in
April, 1966. The commandant of Halim Field, headquarters for the
plotters, Major Sujono, was next, being sentenced to death in June,
1966. Aseli, a PKI organizer, learned his fate in August, 1966.
With each new guilty verdict, the military felt that Sukarno's credibility was being diminished. At the same time, General Suharto
moved to increase the military's prestige by freeing 15 prominent
politicians who had been incarcerated by Sukarno.

48

Most of these

individuals were well-known figures who had been associated with
political organizations that had been outlawed by Sukarno. The
charges brought against the men had been "a dislike of Guided
Democracy." The military hoped that this action would put themselves into the position of being considered humanitarians while at
the same time portraying Sukarno as an unfeeling dictator.
During these early trials, the prosecution repeatedly tried
to get the defendants to implicate Sukarno or at least his top subordinates in the planning, execution, and cover-up of GESTAPU.

In this

maneuver, however, they were not successful. All the defendants
steadfastly maintained they had only been working for the good of the
Indonesian "state.'' All the defendants stated they were merely

48New York Times, May 18, 1966, p. 8.

49
operating to "serve" the Great Leader of the Revolution (Sukarno).
Major Sujono was typical:

11

Without Bung Karno, the revolution cannot

be completed and President Sukarno cannot be replaced by another. "49
Couched in these terms, their testimony only indirectly suggested
Sukarno's responsibility in his role as head of state.

The military

prosecutors felt it was impossible to connect Sukarno to the plotters
on the basis of such weak, inconclusive evidence.
While the early trials were in session, Sukarno made
numerous public appearances in which he refuted any suggestion that
he was in league with the plotters. As early as two weeks a~er the
coup attempt, Sukarno promised to find the "true roots" of
GESTAPU.

50

These appearances were planned to keep Sukarno's

charismatic personality in the public eye while at the same time
mitigating the growing influence of the military.

This pattern of

speaking out against any new disclosure was to continue right up
until the termination of Sukarno's power in March, 1967.

Indeed,

in a speech less than three months before his removal from office,
Sukarno said, "Some people have asked me to keep quiet and not make
any speeches.

49
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But I cannot be quiet.

When I feel I should support,

New York Times, May 30, 1966, p. 2.
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I will support.

I am the Great Leader of the Revolution and I will lead

the revolution according to my own conviction. " 51

In the early days of

the post-GESTAPU era, such rhetoric was accepted.

Later it would

not be.
Because these minor figures had failed to produce the
necessary evidence to implicate Sukarno, the prosecution felt it was
ti.me to move against his major subordinates. Those selected for
special attention by the military included Finance Minister Josef
Mustafa Dalam, the Deputy Premier of Indonesia, Dr. Subandrio,
and Air Force Chief of Staff Omar Dhani.

It was felt that by attacking

the major associates of President Sukarno that the military could sway
public opinion to the extent that Sukarno would be forced to resign.
It was in this spirit that the military announced the trial of Dalam in
late August, 1966.

Major Personalities - Dalam
Josef Mustafa Dalam had been the chief financial officer
under President Sukarno. As such, he was in a crucial position to
observe the monetary manipulations of the Sukarno regime.

It was

this area of malfeasance that the military sought to bring to public
attention.

It was felt that if Dalam's fiscal juggling, as well as some

51 New York Times, January 1, 1967, p. 31 .
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personal indiscretions could be associated with Sukarno, public
credibility in the regime would suffer accordingly.

The indictments

against Dalam bore out this decision.
Article I of the indictments charged that between 1964 and
1966, Dalam had attempted to disrupt the governmental fiscal structure as well as the Indonesian economy in general.
that he did this in several ways.

It was alleged

First, it was suggested that Dalam

issued import licenses totalling $270 million on special deferred
payment plans.

It was contended that such actions led to a deficit in

Indonesia's international balance of trade.

Second, it was suggested

that Dalam granted special credits to friends that led to a deficit in
the state budget.

Finally, Dalam was charged with exacerbating the

staggering inflation rate by printing more bank notes, thus increasing
the amount of currency in circulation.
Article II charged that Dalam had imported, without proper
license, firearms from Czechoslovakia.

It was suggested by the

military that these weapons ( 400 submachineguns, 1 , 000 pistols and
ammunition) were destined to be used to arm the
ment of the PKI suggested by Aidit.

"fi.~h

force" move-

(Seep. 29.) Such a connection

would have indeed been injurious to Sukarno because his relationship
with the PKI was such public knowledge.

If such allegations could be

proven, it would appear that Sukarno had been involved in an intrigue
to create an alternative to the military.
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Article III also dealt with Dalam's purported monetary
mismanagement.

It was charged that he embezzled 1 O mill ion rupiahs

in government funds which were transferred with Sukarno's approval
to a special "Fund of the Revolution." It was further charged that this
money was later "loaned" to six private business concerns that paid
an exorbitant interest rate to Dalam for the privilege of the "loan."
Article IV charged Dalam with having six wives as opposed
to the four considered legal by Islamic cannon.

Indeed, it was soon

apparent that the prosecution was as keenly interested in Article IV
as it was in the rest of the indictments.
As the trial unfolded, it was obvious that the military sought
to present spectacular revelations in order to stun the Indonesian
people with the crassness of the present regime. The highlight of the
Dalam trial came with the testimony of Dalam's girlfriends and their
tales of his lavish gifts to them.

52

Titiek Puspa, a 29 year old

actress, told of Dalam's gift of a new American-made automobile.
A 22 year old actress, Tina Wowanrutu, topped this earlier testimony
by relating how Dalam had given her two cars in return for her favors.
The most sensational testimony, however, was reserved for Ida
Auboedah, an 18 year old school-girl, who claimed to have married
Dalam by proxy in 1965. As a wedding gift, she reportedly received

5 2New York Times, September 4, 1966, p. 3.
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a new house just six months prior to GESTAPU in March, 1965.
Using these new disclosures, the military prosecutors repeatedly
sought to portray Dalam as a lecherous public servant who thought
only of his own well-being.

It was hoped that some association could

be constructed with Sukarno's rather glamorous, opulent life-style.
The implication was that Dalam was nothing more than a cheap
imitation of Sukarno.
The defense was no match for the well constructed
government case.

In a weak, feeble rebuttal, Dalam admitted to his

polygamy (Article IV) but said that he was only acting on "orders from
higher ups" on the other charges.

Throughout the trial he steadfastly

refused to name these higher authorities.

As regards the embezzle-

ment charge, Dalam said that Sukarno was in charge of the operation
of the "Fund of the Revolution." According to Dalam, only Sukarno
had the power to disburse funds.

On the charge of issuing improper

licenses and other government documents, Dalam contended that he
only acted on requests signed by Sukarno, or the Deputy Premier
Subandrio.

He stated that he seldom even looked at the requests

personally, usually leaving them to his underlings instead.

(Such a

remark might have had the reverse effect on the tribunal, however,
because while it absolved Dalam of the embezzlement charge, it could
leave him open to a charge of irresponsibility in public office.)

54
Dalam was found guilty on September 9, 1966 of the four
counts listed in the indictments.

In declaring a penalty of death, the

Chief Justice of the Tribunal stated that the verdict was "clearly
supported by the prosecution's case. 1153 In passing sentence the
Chief Justice commented that Dalam deserved no leniency because
throughout the trial he had shown no regret for his actions and that he
was guilty of contempt of court because of his unwillingness to supply
answers to the prosecution's questions as to the purported "higher
ups.

1154

In retrospect, the verdict is certainly open to debate because

most of the state's case was based on unsubstantiated, circumstantial
evidence such as the testimony of Dalam's girlfriends.
Public reaction to the Dalam verdict varied.

The military

felt it had been able to connect Sukarno to the extravagance and
corruption of Dalam by implying that Sukarno had approved in advance
Dalam's illegal activities. Other groups, notably the student organizations, viewed the outcome differently.

These groups were unhappy

that the trial had centered on Dalam's sexual exploits rather than
getting to the real issue of economics. Viewing the trial as a "staged
comedy" with little real significance, Kami Djaya, a student publication said, "The people's hope that their sense of justice would be

53New York Times, September 1 O, 1966, p. 1 .
541bid . ' p. 1 .
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satisfied has been shattered. 1155 The Action Command of Indonesian
Students demanded to know "why there were attempts to distract court
proceedings in another direction whenever the name of President
Sukarno was mentioned. 1156 All of these statements tended to reflect
a lack of faith in Suharto and his new regime. As Is mid Hadad, a
student leader said, "There is no new order as a force yet.
just a climate. The old order is a weakening force.

It is still

Once the central

figure is out, then it will be easy. 1157 Throughout the trial, the
central figure remained silent, not willing to comment or pass judgment on his friend.

The military, however, was not so reticent in

its actions.

Major Personalities - Subandrio
Relatively pleased with the outcome of the Dalam trial, on
October 1, 1966 the military opened the trial of Dr. Subandrio, the
Deputy Premier of Indonesia and Sukarno's chief protege for more
than nine years.

It was more than mere coincidence that the mi.l itary

chose the first anniversary of the coup attempt to try the most powerful of Sukarno's subordinates. At this point the military felt the
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initiative was with them.

It was hoped that a conviction of Subandrio,

coming close on the heels of the Dalam verdict, would push Sukarno's
popularity with the masses even lower, thereby assuring a military
victory in the struggle for the mantle of political leadership in
Indonesia. Again, the verdict was a foregone conclusion.

Even before

opening statements had been heard, the mi. l i.tary sought to characterize
Subandri.o as a durno; a character of the wayang kulit who gives bad
information to his ruler and thus is an evil, untrustworthy servant.
As early as March, 1966, the military had implied that Subandri.o
was the mastermind of GESTAPU in its official publications. 58 The
tribunal was so convinced of Subandrio's guilt that two weeks before
the trial even began, the presiding Chief Justice said, "It should take
us about 12 days to convict him. 1159 All that was needed was for
Subandrio to provide the crucial testimony that would link Sukarno
to GESTAPU.
The indictments against Subandrio, as had been the charges
against Dalam, were deliberately worded in a vague manner.
a two-fold purpose.

This had

First, and most obviously, the military sought to

make things as difficult as possible for the defense by never specifically
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enumerating the charges against the defendant.

Second, the military

hoped that Subandrio would try to save himself by directly naming
Sukarno in the events of September 30 - October 1 , 1965.

When made

public, the reaction of many responsible groups in Indonesian society
was one of general rejection and displeasure.

This was particularly

true of the student groups who characterized Subandrio as a greedy,
self-centered public servant with little regard for the common man. 60
The indictments against Subandrio purported that he:
1.

Was a mainstay in the planning and execution of the
events of GESTAPU.

2.

Had embezzled more than $500,000 in government
funds and then diverted this state revenue for
personal use.

3.

Subverted efforts to restore order in the wake of the
defeat of the coup attempt.

Subandrio pleaded innocent to the charges brought against him.
The state's case basically sought to link Subandrio (and
through him, Sukarno) with selling out to the Chinese communists.
Particularly damaging to Subandrio's defense was the testimony of
two of his closest subordinates.

His personal secretary Hartono,

stated that Subandrio took $500, 000 meant to cover expenditures at
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the upcoming Afro-Asian Conference and banked the money for his own
uses.

Hartono further testified that Subandrio had sent him on a

secret mission in February, 1965 to transfer the money to an unnumbered account in Geneva, Switzerland.

Statements such as these

tended to confirm the state's allegations of fiscal mismanagement on
Subandrio's part.

(Later, during the defense stage of the proceedings,

Subandri.o claimed he had diverted the money to save it for a planetarium for "all the people.

1161

Such an explanation only brought more

sarcastic rebuttals from the prosecution.)
Equally injurious to Subandrio's case was the testimony of
Suwito Kusumowidagdo, the First Deputy Foreign Minister.

In

testimony before the tribunal on October 10, 1966, Suwito stated that
Subandrio had conspired with Air Marshall Dhani (later a key
defendant) to secretly transport Chinese-made weapons for the proposed "fifth force" of the PKI into Indonesia without the knowledge of
the Minister of Defense, General Nasution.
drawn from such a statement is obvious.

62

The inference to be

Whi.le Suwito was merely

interpreting his own thoughts, the military tribunal was undoubtedly
swayed by his statement.

The implication is as follows:

was a close associate of Sukarno.

6

Sukarno was favorable to the PKI

1 Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval, p. 247.
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Subandrio

New York Ti.mes, October 11, 1966, p. 6.
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and reportedly sympathetic to the creation of a party-sponsored
para-military capability for the FKI.

Hence, since Subandrio was

in charge of procuring weapons for this unit, Sukarno undoubtedly
was aware of the acti.vi.ti.es of hi.s subordinate.
guilty of complicity.

If he did, he was

If not, he should be discharged from his office

on grounds of negligence.

While such a conclusion is highly circum-

spect, in the emotion reaction to GESTAPU, it was entirely possible
that this was how the military interpreted Suwi.to's testimony.

This

feeling was given added credence when the state was able to produce
yet another witness, Kartono Kadri, a former section chief of the
Central Intelligence Board who claimed to have seen Subandrio destroy
a letter to Sukarno from Ai.dit which outlined how Sukarno could create
the

"fi~h

force" with weapons secretly purchased from the People's

Republic of China.

63

Kartono said the letter was burned "because it

concerned something i.n the past and because it involved President
Sukarno. " 64 This letter was to become the first concrete evidence
of Sukarno's involvement in the coup attempt.
Another segment of the indictment dealt with Subandrio's
alleged subversion of attempts to restore order following the coup.

63 0. G. Roeder, "Out of Time," Far Eastern Economic
Review 54 (October 20, 1966), pp. 117-119.
64 New York Times, October 8, 1966, p. 4.
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The state contended that Subandrio tried to divert attention from
himself and Sukarno

a~er

October 1, 1965 by claiming a British-

American plot to attack Indonesia in late 1965. To pursue this point
further, the prosecution introduced into evidence a curious document
known as the "Gilchrist letter." Thi.s letter was allegedly a paper
written by Sir Andrew Gilchrist, the former British ambassador
to Indonesia purporting to outline a joint British-American plot,
"together with some local army friends" to overthrow the Sukarno
regime. The letter reportedly found its way into Subandrio's possession in his capacity as the chief of intelligence in March, 1966 when
he received a copy of the report along with a brief detailing how the
document had been "found" in the Djakarta home of one William Palmer,
an American businessman representing the Motion Picture Export
Association in Indonesia. According to the Communist Youth League
members who uncovered the plot, Palmer was an operative of the
American Central Intelligence Agency who had fled Indonesia fearing
his discovery. When asked what he did wi.th the letter, Subandrio later
testified that he kept it a secret, wanting "only to use the document in
the international arena against the British. 1165 When queried as to
whether he had shown the report to Sukarno, Subandrio testified that
he had, but that Sukarno had wanted to keep it a secret until the second

65shaplen, Time Out of Hand, p. 98.
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Afro-Asian Conference scheduled for June, 1965. At that meeting,
Sukarno hoped to embarass the British and Americans by distributing
copies of the letter to all the delegates assembled.

(The conference,

as i.t turned out, was never convened.) Both men, however, i.n
speeches made pri.or to the coup attempt, hi.nted at "evidence of an
i.mperiali.st plot to destroy Indonesia. 1166 Yet, neither Sukarno nor
Subandri.o ever specifically mentioned the Gilchrist correspondence
i.n public, bei.ng content to merely hint at its existence.
It was the mi.litary's contention that the letter was a total
fabrication, probably the product of the CIB that Subandrio headed.
The prosecution expressed its belief that the letter was an attempt by
Subandrio and Sukarno to provide themselves with an "out" if the coup
attempt proved abortive.

The military also strongly hinted that the

letter had been prepared in collaboration with the PKI with whom
Subandrio had allegedly formed at least a tacit alliance on the question
of the

"fi.~h

force." This relationship was given further substance

when the prosecution repeatedly brought up Subandri.o's burning of the
letter from Aidit to Sukarno.
With the proceedings in a critical state of balance, the
prosecution produced yet another bombshell.

This was a document

purported to be Ai.dit's "confession" made just prior to his execution
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by government troops in November, 1965. Quoting the Japanese dai.ly
Asahil Shimbun, the "confession" read in part as follows:
I, Aidit, have the highest responsibility for the
September 30 incident. The incident was supported by other
leaders of the party and leaders of mass organizations associated with the party. Dissatisfaction with the present setup
was the basic starting point for the coup d'etat. I thought that
if a national unification government was established under the
communist party leadership, the state would recover, the
people's livelihood would improve .... I planned to effect
closer relations with China economically too, if the coup
d'etat proved successful. 67
Several implications can be gleaned from this statement.
First, the confession apparently exonerated Sukarno and placed the
onus for GESTAPU clearly on the shoulders of the PKI and its chairman, Aidit.

Second, in giving his motives for the coup attempt, in

his statement Aidit makes no mention of a reactionary "Council of
Generals." By merely alluding to "dissatisfaction" with the present
regime, he leaves the door open for a myriad of interpretations. This
would lend credibility to the mili.tary's claims while at the same ti.me
further damaging the image of the PKI. Third, by hinting that closer
relations with Red China would have followed had the coup been
successful, the "confession" conveniently turns an internal matter
into an international one, again deflecting the spotlight of public
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scrutiny from Subandrio and Sukarno.

In the state's thinking, the

"confession" provided a neat conclusion to an extremely complex
problem.
It was precisely this simplicity that the military prosecutors
sought to attack.

Government witnesses present at the execution

admitted that Aidit talked freely before his death. The substance of
his conversations is debatable, however, as only military men were
present.

It would have been very convenient for Aidit to assume all

the responsibility for GESTAPU at the hour of his death.
be convenient for Subandrio and Sukarno as well.
fact.

It would also

Too convenient in

Accordingly throughout the trial, the military sought to use the

"confession," not as an indication of Subandrio's innocence but rather
just the opposite; that the "confession" was the result of some prearranged Faustian deal between Aidit and Subandrio to save themselves
in the event the coup failed.

What incentive they might have offered is

simply a matter of speculation.

By repeatedly bringing to mind the

relationship between Aidit and Sukarno the military further sought to
implicate the President in the illicit deal.

While the argument is

tenuous at best, one must remember the environment in which this
evidence was presented.

Operating in a military courtroom, with a

tribunal of ardent, anti-communist officers, in a country wracked by
deep seated social prejudices, the contention that Aidit's "confession"
was a fabrication was ideal to the military' s strategy. While the
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document may have indeed been val id, the very thought of its lack of
authenticity cast aspersions on Subandrio and through him, Sukarno.
This was brought home in the testimony of General Edhy' s
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aide who

remarked, "Communists may talk, but good communists never
confess."
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In the end, it was enough to condemn Subandrio.

The state's case against Subandrio was admittedly weak.
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For the most part, the prosecution's evidence was purely circumstantial which at best proved Subandrio's negligence but certainly not
his complicity with the PKI or his involvement in illegal activities.
Indeed, on the basis of the evidence presented, the worst "crime"
Subandrio might have committed was to have been lax in his duties as
the head of state security by not checking out thoroughly the so-cal led
"Gilchrist letter."
As has been said above, the evidence in the Subandrio trial
was weak and inconclusive.

The most convincing pieces of evidence

presented by the prosecution were excerpts from public speeches made
by Subandrio during the months before and after the coup attempt.

It

was the prosecution's contention that these speeches contained off-hand

68General Sarwo Edhy was the officer given charge of the
anti-communist campaign by General Suharto.
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references that showed the depth of Subandrio's involvement in the
coup attempt.

The following examples are indicative of the type of

statements asserted by the prosecution to be concrete proof of
Subandrio's complicity in GESTAPU.
Nine months prior to the coup attempt, Subandrio gave
an exclusive interview to the government news agency, Antara.

In

this interview, Subandrio made the following statement, "Don't be
surprised if at a certain time we leave those behind who were our
comrades-in-arms because they don't understand the revolutionary aims
and have become counterrevolutionary. 1171

The prosecution pointed

to this statement as evidence that Subandri.o was involved with persons
or groups unknown to overthrow the existing government.

On the

basis of previously presented testimony, the state strongly hinted that
the mysterious party was the PKI.

In his defense, Subandrio con-

tended that he was only trying to appeal to the nationalistic fervor
of the masses to confront the massive social and economic woes of
Indonesia.

He stated that by "counterrevolutionary" he was not

referring to any specific group but was only trying to bring to public
awareness those individuals who wished to slow down the pace of
.
. I n d ones1a.
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revo l u t lon
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71 I bid. , p. 4.

72 Ibid., p. 5.
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A second selection chosen by the prosecution to show
Subandrio's guilt was taken from an interview he gave to a Djakartabased Muslim newspaper.

In this article, Subandrio was quoted as

saying, "Don't be surprised if some of our former friends fall."
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The state asserted that this reference, when coupled with the first
stated above, definitely showed that Subandrio was plotting to effect
drastic change in Indonesia's political leadership.

In his defense,

Subandrio retorted that he was simply "leaking" the news that a
shake-up in the Cabinet was imminent. As it turned out, Subandrio's
predictions were accurate as in March and April, 1965 several high
echelon government officials were dismissed because of their opposition to Sukarno's excessive Konfrontasi policy against Malaysia. 74
A final example comes from a speech Subandrio delivered
to a group of pro-communist

studen~

than a month before the coup attempt.

in August, 1965 a little more
In this address, Subandrio is

quoted as saying, "You must fight terror with counter-terror. 1175
The military claims that this statement shows that Subandrio knew of
a coup plot and was forewarning his pro-communist colleagues of the
necessity to be ruthless and vengeful when the appointed hour comes.

7 3Ibid., p. 5.
74
75

shaplen, Time Out of Hand, p. 86.

Ibid., p. 89.
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Subandrio replied that he was only warning of the consequences of
using terror to solve social problems, not advocating it.

The state

replied that the speech was aimed at "creating unrest and disunity"
among the people for the purpose of personal political gain.

76

When studying these quotes there is little to suggest the
conclusions drawn by the mi. litary.

Granted they do express a sense

of dissension wi.thi.n the government but they hardly show that
Subandri.o was involved with the PKI.

However, just as i.n the case

of the Gilchrist letter and the Ai.dit "confession," the quotes were
enough to convince the already biased tribunal of Subandrio's guilt.
Now it was the defense's turn.

Staffed by a battery of

civilian attorneys, the defense put together a strong case i.n
Subandri.o's behalf.

In its opening statements, the defense attempted

to have the case thrown out on a jurisdictional technicality.

The

defense argued that the military tribunal was "incompetent" to try
the defendant as he still was a member of the Cabinet (Subandrio had
never relinquished his official positions) and could thereby only be
tried in the Indonesian Supreme Court according to Indonesian law.

77

Sitting in special emergency session, the Supreme Court rejected the
motion, ruling that under the present circumstances the military

76
77

Ibi.d., p. 91.
New York Ti.mes, October 2, 1966, p. 10.
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court was the proper juri.sdi.cti.on.

In its brief on the matter, the

Supreme Court ordered the trial to reconvene on October 3, 1965.
At the outset of the trial, Subandri.o had vehemently denied
the charges lodged against him.

Now, with the hope of a qui.ck verdict

of acquittal gone, Subandri.o began to recant many of his initial statements.

Yes, he admitted, he had known of a deal with Red China to

arm 100, 000 workers and peasants with weapons brought into the
country illegally.

78

On the charge of covering up the coup attempt,

Subandrio admitted that he was told on September 15, 1965 that there
would be an attempted coup on the 19th.

He also acknowledged that he

had heard rumours of a "Council of Generals 11 but that he had di.smissed them as "groundless."

When queried as to whether he had

ever approached Sukarno with these reports, Subandrio replied that
he had been reluctant to do so because he "felt the President knew
more than he di.d. 1179
Suddenly taking the offensive again, Subandrio launched into
a bitter denunciation of the prosecution at this point.
misinterpreted his actions, Subandri.o explained.

78"The Man on Trial:
1966' p. 44.

The state had

Describing himself

Subandrio," Time, October 14,

7 9NewYorkTi.mes, October4, 1966, p. 4.
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as a "single fighter," Subandrio denied any association with the
PKI. 80 As he said, "The Communist Party was in dee l i.ne.
myself to i.t would have been political suicide.

To attach

If it had ever come to

power, I do not know whether I would have ever seen the sun again. 11 81
On the question of his role i.n GESTAPU, Subandrio again reiterated
his innocence.

Explaining the need for leadership in any great social

movement, Subandrio commented,

11

I am too small a man.

like to become a great man but I cannot.

1182

I would

On this poignant note,

Subandri.o began his summation.
Perhaps Subandrio realized the futility of his efforts for the
first ti.me. Perhaps i.t was simply a sense of weariness.

In a clear,

resonant voice, Subandri.o threw himself on the mercy of the court.
He said,
I feel gratified to have been briefly before this tribunal,
because I feel like a human being again after having been
regarded as the scum of society for a year. Whatever the
verdict, I will accept it. I believe the verdict will not be pronounced by individuals but whispered by God to the judges. 83
Wi.th these few simple words Subandrio completed his defense and was
silent.

80New York Ti.mes, October ~8, 1966, p. 8.
81 Ibid., p. 8.
82oonald Kirk, "Indonesia's Revolutionary Justice,"
New Leader 49 (November 7, 1 966), pp. 3-5.
8 3New York Ti.mes, October 18, 1966, p. 8.
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Subandrio was found guilty and sentenced to death on
October 25, 1966.

The state argued that because Subandrio had

"brought tragedy to Indonesia and misery to all layers of the
community," there was little reason for a lenient sentence. 8 4
Describing Subandrio as a hypocrite who likes to pretend, Chief
Justice Lt. Col. Ali Said called Subandrio, "a defendant with a very
strong memory when the facts were in his favor but forgetting when
circumstances might damage his case.

1185

When informed of the

sentence, Subandrio stated that while Indonesian law provided for an
automatic appeal of a death sentence, for the good of Indonesia, he
would not do so.

Thus, loyal and true to the end, Subandrio refused

to place Sukarno in the ponderous position of having to make a decision
between political expendiency and personal friendship.

It would be

interesting to speculate on what might have happened had Subandrio
chosen to appeal his conviction.
At this point, some analysis of the proceedings would appear
in order.

There can be no doubt that the Subandrio trial had a pro-

found impact on Indonesian history.

For one thing, Subandrio's

sentence dramatizes the end of the pro-communist, pro-Peking period

84New York Times, October 26, 1966, p. 4.
85oonald Kirk, "Indonesia's Revolutionary Justice,"
New Leader 49 (November 7, 1966), pp. 3-5.
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in Indonesian history.
ended.

What the purges started, the Subandrio trial

Yet what of the military's efforts to discredit Sukarno through

the trials of hi.s subordinates? Viewed from this perspective, the
Subandrio trial must be seen as a major disappointment to the military.
Nowhere did the military obtain a direct statement about Sukarno's
involvement. At the outset, it was hoped that Sukarno would voluntarily testify at the trial. This did not occur, however, because to do
so would have left Sukarno vulnerable to hostile cross-examination.
Instead, Sukarno's written testimony, answering questions provided
by the prosecution was read into the official transcript.

His testimony

can be summarized as follows:
1.

Sukarno stated that he had only ordered Njoto (a high
ranking PKI official) to return from Central Java in
order to assist him in writing his speech presented on
Independence Day, August 17, 1965. The state had
previously hinted that Sukarno had recalled Njoto in
order to finalize plans for the attempted coup.

2.

Sukarno replied that he had not received any information
from Subandrio on increased PKT activity prior to
September 30 -October 1, 1965.

(This would appear to

be in keeping with Subandrio's statement that he thought
Sukarno had already been informed of this matter.)
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3.

Sukarno responded that he had heard rumours of a
"Council of Generals" prior to the coup attempt, but
that when he discussed the matter with General Yani.,
his questions had been adequately answered.

4.

Sukarno contended that the coup had caught him
completely off guard.

86

Never did Subandri.o ever directly implicate his superior,
Sukarno.

Granted, hi.s reference to "the need for a great man" might

have inferred Sukarno.

Likewise, his summation statement that,

"all the Ministers wi.thout exception acted only as assistants to the
President," might be taken to imply Sukarno's complicity.

87

Yet

nowhere did Subandri.o use the opportunity given him by the vagueness
of the indictments to save himself by naming Sukarno to anything even
remotely connected wi.th GESTAPU.
Even the guilty verdict in the Subandri.o case could not
qui.et the ri.si.ng crescendo of discontent now beginning to be heard
from various segments of Indonesian soci.ety.

Particularly vocal were

the student groups who referred to the Subandrio trial as a "staged
comedy" and repeated their demands for an investigation into

86
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Sukarno's role in GESTAPU.

The students went so far as to invade

the Presidential palace chanting "Court-martial Sukarno!" on three
separate occasions. 88 With the failure of the Subandrio trial to turn
the spotlight on Sukarno, the military announced the indictments of
another chief Sukarno assistant, Air Marshall Omar Dhani.. The
military anxiously hoped that the Dhani. trial would provide the
elusive link i.t needed to associate Sukarno with GESTAPU.

It was

in this frame of mind that the military opened the trial of Dhani on
December 5, 1966.

Major Personal iti.es - Dhani
The charge leveled against Dhani in the indictments was for
his complicity i.n the events of September 30 -October 1, 1965.

In

comparison to the vagueness of the charges in the Dalam and Subandri.o
trials, the indictment against Dhani. was much more specific and to the
point.

Several interpretations of the mil i.tary' s motives are possi.b le.

Perhaps the military was becoming bored with the legal maneuverings
and simply wished to get the trial over with as soon as possible.

More

probable, however, i.s the interpretation that the military was beginning
to feel the pressures exerted by the students to bring Sukarno to
justice.

By using vague terms, the military had assured itself a guilty

88 11 The Man on Tri.al:
p. 44.

Subandrio," Ti.me, October 14, 1966,
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verdict.

Yet the convictions had not had the intended effect of

displacing Sukarno.

Therefore, i.t was entirely possible that the

military opted for a more specific indictment that would bring about
the desired response.

In addition, a full disclosure of Sukarno's

involvement could only add to the legitimacy of the military's quest
to resolve the existing crisis in political leadership.

In any event,

Dhani was considered to know the most of any of the three major
defendants about Sukarno's role in the coup attempt. As such, the
Dhani trial was to differ si.gnifi.cantly from the previous two trials in
that Dhani was not portrayed as a mastermind of GESTAPU but rather
as a prominent player in its drama.
Throughout the proceedings the prosecution attempted to
portray Dhani as a naive man with a "mitty-like" dream of succeeding
Sukarno as President had the coup been successful.

89

The state

strongly implied that Dhani was a weak, gul li.ble man who was thoroughly manipulated by the PKI in their attempts to defeat the challenge
of the military.

His only attraction to the PKI, the prosecution argued,

was that he controlled access to Halim fi.eld, the area selected to be
the headquarters for the plotters.

In response to the charge of having

given opportunity and aid to the plotters, Dhani replied that, "I know

89 Jerome R. Bass, "The PKI and the Attempted Coup,"
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 1 (January, 1969), pp. 103-104.
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now I was wrong in the actions I committed.
intention of overthrowing the government."

But I never had any

90

Then Dhani added a

curious comment stating that his only purpose in life was to "implant
Bung's teachings in the Air Force" and to make all of his men "little
Sukarnos. "

Dhani. stressed that he had al ways believed he was

fighting for the President and his country.

91

This statement, perhaps

added as an afterthought, was precisely what the military had been so
futilely searching for.

It was the comment that would bring down

Bung Karno.
As the trial progressed, it was obvious that Dhani was now
a secondary figure destined to play out the shadowy drama conceived
by the two protagonists, Suharto and Sukarno.

The majority of the

prosecution's questions did not even deal with Dhani..

Instead, the

state sought to pin down witnesses as to Sukarno's role in the events
at Halim after he arrived there on the morning of October 1 , 1965.
Particularly damaging was the testimony of Heru Atmodjo, an enlisted
man who described Sukarno as apparently congratulating Supardjo on
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the success of the coup by slapping him on the shoulder.
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According

to the prosecution, this action could be interpreted as concrete proof
of Sukarno's involvement.
Yet, it was Dhani who ironically gave the testimony that was
to cause Sukarno's downfall.

During his cross-examination Dhani

attempted to clarify some points regarding Sukarno's presence at
Halim.

While he resolutely refused to implicate Sukarno directly,

his testimony nevertheless was crucial. According to Dhani, Sukarno
had given at least tacit approval to the murders of the military officers
on the PKI death list.

When informed of the killings, Dhani recalled

that Sukarno responded, "Good. This is an event in the revolution.

1193

While Dhani stated that he did not know whether Sukarno had had any
prior knowledge of the plans, he did say that Sukarno did not appear
distraught at the news.

When asked by a member of the tribunal if

Sukarno had ever expressed any dissatisfaction with the plotters in
Dhani 's presence, the defendant resolutely answered, "No."

94

Coupled with the revelations of the "slapping incident" one can see how
the ti.de was slowly turning in favor of the military.

92 0. G. Roeder, "Trial by Proxy," Far Eastern Economic
Review 54 (December 22, 1966), p. 587.
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Si.nee the beginning of the Subandri.o trial, the prosecution
had been agitating i.n the press for Sukarno to come forward and
explain his role i.n GESTAPU.

The subsequent i.niti.ati.on of charges

against Dhani. had renewed this cry for information.

Just as in the

Subandri.o case, however, Sukarno di.stained a court appearance that
would have exposed him to a strong cross-examination by the state.
Now, with the damaging testimony of the Dhani trial made public,
Sukarno sensed it was time to take the offensive in order to stem the
mounting ti.de of public criticism.

In a written deposition Sukarno

stated the fol lowi.ng:
1•

That Dhani. had spoken with him on the day prior to the
coup (September 29, 1965) but that at no ti.me had they
discussed the rumour of a "Council of Generals."
(In his earlier testimony, Dhani had stated that the
subject had indeed been a topic of conversation at that
meeting.)

2.

That the coup had been a total surprise to him.

In this,

he reiterated his written testimony given at the time of
the Subandri.o trial.
3.

That he had gone to Halim of his own free wi.11, not to
associate with the plotters but to "confront" them.
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4.

That he had heard a "rumour" that several mi. litary
officers had been killed in the coup attempt. To the
specific details of this "rumour," Sukarno apologized
that his memory was "faulty. 119,5

In retrospect, this attempt by Sukarno seems feeble indeed.

Taken

as a counter-weight against the testimony presented at the trial,
Sukarno's deposition appears shallow and unconvincing.
The end was near for Dhani.

In a final, desperate move,

Dhani 's lawyers tried to save their client by inferring that he had only
acted on orders "from above." Ra'den Soenario, one of Dhani's
lawyers summarized the image the defense wanted to portray when
he said in his closing statements, "The accused is a very loyal and
good disciple of President Sukarno.

I can only say that he is in fact

a victim. 1196 At that point, however, any attempt at confession would
have fallen on deaf ears. The tribunal was after bigger game than a
vain, arrogant military officer. The military was sure of its case
against Sukarno now.

This heightened confidence was given even

greater significance when the tribunal found Dhani guilty on
December 24, 1966 and sentenced him to death.

950. G. Roeder, "Trial by Proxy," Far Eastern Economic
Review 54 (December 22, 1966), p. 587.
96 New York Times, December 22, 1966, p. 7.
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When viewed in retrospect, there can be no doubt that the
Dhani trial was by far the most damaging for Sukarno.

Until this time,

he had been able to explain away or brush off any suggestion of his
involvement, relying heavily on his magnetic personality and relationship with the masses.

Now this relationship had been challenged.

The

testimony of the Dhani trial had raised questions such as the "slapping
incident" that Sukarno had not anticipated.
not be explained away.

It was an action that could

Sukarno was being forced to come up with

specific informative answers to questions regarding his personal
behavior.
Likewise, the Dhani trial had initiated new pressures from
all segments of society for an investigation of Sukarno's role in
GESTAPU.

Initially, only the student groups and action fronts had

pushed for Sukarno to reveal his role.

As a result of the Dhani trial,

important leaders in the civilian sector began to press for a full
disclosure by Sukarno.

Speaking just three days

a~er

the guilty

verdict in the Dhani case, a Djakarta-based association of Muslim
groups called for Sukarno's resignation, describing him as a
"destructive opposition" to Suharto's development of a new cabinet.
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The chairman of the Indonesian Lawyer's Association, commenting on
the evidence presented at the Dhani trial, concluded Sukarno had

9 7 New York Times, December 27, 1966, p. 9.

80
encouraged the coup.

According to him, since the others (Dalam,

Subandrio, Dhani) had received the death sentence, "the same should
apply to Sukarno. 1198
It was apparent that the Dhani trial had been influential in
garnering support for the military while at the same time destroying
one of Sukarno's main bastions of support, the confidence of the
masses.

8
9 Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval, p. 277.

CHAPTER VI

THE TRIALS AND SUKARNO - II

Sensing that the Dhani trial had succeeded in placing
Sukarno on the defensive, the military now sought to continue its
pressure through the prosecution of several lesser figures who could
now directly tie Sukarno to the coup attempt.

The military hoped that

by gaining guilty verdicts against these lesser figures the public outrage would be so great that Sukarno would be forced either to make
a damning public confession or resign outright.

Regardless, the

military would be the victor in the power struggle without appearing
to have been the aggressor.

Illustrative of the military's new strategy

was the trial of General Mastafa Sjarif Supardjo which began in
February, 1967.

The Supardjo Trial
General Supardjo was important to the military's overall
strategy for several reasons.

First, he was the leader of the pro-

gressive element in the military and as such, a key link between the
discontented military factions and the communists. While one of the
decorations Supardjo had received in his military career was for his
role in defeating the communist coup attempt at Madiun in 1948, it was
81

82

widely suspected that he was extremely pro-PK!.

(This was borne out

in testimony at the trial which appeared to show that Supardjo had been
in close communication with Sjam, the chief deputy of Aidit, for
99
.
several months prior to October 1, 1965 .)
Second, SupardJo was
an arrogant, ambitious man who sought promotion rapidly.

When

advancement di.d not come fast enough to suit him, the prosecution
contended that Supardjo was more than willing to associate himself
with any movement that would assure him the rewards he desired.
The state therefore desired to portray Supardjo as a totally reprehensible individual.
turn against him.

It was expected that the public would completely

Thus, it was essential that some link between

Supardjo and Sukarno be forged.

The military did not have to wait

long.
Much of the testimony in the Supardjo trial was vague and
confusing.

In pursuing its indictment of conspiracy, the state sought

to establish Supardjo's relationship with the other, already convicted
conspirators.

To this end, the state questioned Dhani and Lt. Col.

Untung, the head of the palace guards who was generally recognized
as the head of the coup movement in the military.

Untung was of little

help, denying that Supardjo was even part of the movement, implying

99shaplen, Time Out of Hand, p. 101 •
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contemptuously that Supardjo was only a willing dupe to be manipulated.
Dhani 's testimony was more revealing.
Dhani stated that since he himself was innocent, he would not
have known if Supardjo was involved or not.
"I was never sure whether Supardjo

Yet, according to Dhani,

was in command of the

September 30th Movement or whether he received commands from
someone else.

11100

The inference is obvious.

had failed to make any incriminating statement.

True to form, Dhani
Yet, by even implying

that "someone else" might have been involved, he gave the military the
answer they wanted so desperately to hear.
It was at this point that the state dropped a bombshell.

The

prosecution now revealed that Supardjo had been able to escape capture
after the defeat of the coup attempt because he carried a letter of protection supposedly written by Sukarno.

According to the prosecution,

Supardjo received the letter authorizing his safe passage into the
hinterlands while Sukarno and Supardjo were together at Halim on the
morning of October 1.

This letter, the prosecution charged, was the

reason Supardjo had been able to resist arrest until he was spotted by
government troops in January, 1967.
The state alleged that Supardjo had used the letter given him
by Sukarno to secure lodgings in his flight to avoid capture.

1 OONew York Times, February 26, 1967, p. 14.

To prove
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this point, the state produced several witnesses.
was former navy major, Suwardi.

The first of these

According to his testimony,

Supardjo had lived in Suwardi 's home for a short period immediately
after GESTAPU.

Suwardi claimed that he did not know who Supardjo

was, but that because he carried a letter from Bung Karna, he must
have been an influential person.

Accordingly, Suwardi. accommodated

his distinguished but anonymous guest.

1 01

A second witness, a

former PKI member, also referred to the letter ordering that
"Supardjo be protected and given shelter.

11102

While the military

was never able to concretely produce the letter or even provide conclusive evidence as to its existence (Samsi, the PKI member, had
testified that he never actually "saw" the letter), the implication was
too conclusive.

Coming on the heels of the revelations from the

previous trials, it was now at least conceivable that Sukarno had
known of and approved the coup attempt.

Even while Supardjo was

pleading in vain that he had never known of such a document, the
military was preparing to lay the basis of its New Order that would
lead to the resolution of the problem of political change in Indonesia.
When the guilty verdict was returned against Supardjo on March 13,
1967 much more than a dissident military officer had been found guilty.

101 New York Ti.mes, March 1, 1967, p. 4.
102 Ibid., p. 4.
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The End of Sukarno
The displacement of Indonesian President Sukarno in 1967
represents a major turning point in the history of Southeast Asia.
stopped the ascendency of the PKI within Indonesia.

It

It halted, then

reversed Indonesia's close ties with Communist China.

It allowed

contending political parties to once again bloom i.n Indonesia.

It

rehabilitated the Indonesian economy, long stagnant under Sukarno.
Perhaps even more important than these considerations, however,
is that the displacement of Sukarno provides an insight into how one
country resolved a crisis in political leadership.
There are three well-defined stages of Sukarno's demise
in the days following GESTAPU.

.

During the period October 1, 1965

to March 11, 1966, Sukarno attempted to restore pre-coup tranquility
in Indonesia.

In the days immediately following the coup attempt

Sukarno was pressured by the military to explain his role in the
events of September 30 - October 1 .

It must be remembered that at

no ti.me during this period did Sukarno ever once denounce the actions
of the plotters or attempt to disassociate himself from the PKI.
Indeed, Sukarno's biggest error during this ti.me was his attempt to
hang on to his relationship with the PKI i.n the face of mounting
pressure from the military.
immediately

a~er

In statements reassuring the people

October 1, 1965, Sukarno tried to soothe the fears

of the masses by telling them that Indonesia was safe because
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"Indonesia's is a Left Revolution. " 103 On February 14, 1966, Sukarno
even went so far as to praise the PKI as "the only party which made
considerable contributions and sacrifices for the independence of the
country."

104

Statements such as these could only have served to

di.vi.de Sukarno from portions of the population in the highly emotional
state that then existed.

He was able, however, to meet the initial

challenge to his authority by using his charismatic appeal with the
majority of the Indonesian masses.

Speaking in a nation-wide radio

broadcast i.n mid-January, 1966, Sukarno said,
I am sick of the secret campaign being launched against
me. I, Sukarno, as the Great Leader of the Revolution, the
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, say whoever is
still willing to follow me should rally behind me, defend me,
build your strength. 105
The tone in this speech is unmistakable.

Sukarno was still the

unquestioned favorite of the Indonesian masses.
Sukarno appeared at this point to be playing a dangerous
game.

Believing that the people were still with him, Sukarno made

two bold moves to re-establish his power base.

In late February,

1966, he reshuffled his Cabinet to include many pro-PK I, pro-Chinese

103
(Vancouver:

Justus M. van der Kroef, Indonesia After Sukarno
University of British Columbia Press, 1971), p. 18.

104
Ibid., p. 19.
105Shaplen, Ti.me Out of Hand, p. 134.
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members.

One of the ministers deposed was General Nasution, the

lone survivor of the death squads and symbol of the military's
participation in politics.

Indeed, the post of Minister for Aircraft

Industry went to none other than Omar Dhani, who had been out of
the country on a "special mission" for Sukarno and who had not yet
been arrested.

Sukarno, ever the idealist, described the changes

as "just a normal reshuffle so my assistants can better help me carry
on the revolution. " 106 The military did not take such a casual view,
however.

Suharto, who had retained his dual roles of Minister of the

Army and Chief of Staff, was furious but held back his anger because
he felt the time was not yet ripe to openly challenge Sukarno.
On February 24, 1966, Sukarno alienated another segment
of society when he banned the major student organization, the KAMI .
Prior to the order, this group had been vocally advocating the removal
of Subandrio, the banning of the PKI, and the lowering of prices to
combat the rampant rate of inflation that had soared to 600 percent in
late 1965. The students responded to Sukarno's order by openly
demonstrating against the government. To deal with the problem,
Sukarno ordered the military to disperse the students, with bloodletting if necessary. While the military leadership was indignant over
the Presidential order to "chase kids," the student demonstrations
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gave the mi li.tary the necessary leverage to demand more power to
maintain civil order on March 11 , 1966.

In li.ght of the fact that he

had ordered the military into action in the first place, Sukarno could
hardly refuse.
March 12, 1966 to January 1 O, 1967 saw mounting criticism
of Sukarno from all responsible segments of Indonesian soci.ety.

On

March 12, 1966 Sukarno finally agreed to formally ban the PKI as a
political force in Indonesia.

In retrospect, this attempt at conciliation

came too late to be of any value.

Sukarno had waited too long to

renounce hi.s former associates.

Immediately after the signing of the

order banning the PKI, the military moved against the pro-PKI
Gabi.net members.

Clai.mi.ng to be acting for "their own safety," the

mi. litary placed under house arrest such prominent government
personalities as Subandri.o, Charul Saleh, the Thi.rd Deputy Premier,
Major General Achmadi., the Information Mi.ni.ster, Minister of
Elections Sumardjo and Lenin Pri.ze winner Peijono, the Minister of
Education.

A new Gabi.net, with General Suharto i.n charge of security

and defense, was sworn i.n on March 27, 1966.
Sukarno's world was crumbling on the i.nternati.onal front
as well.

On June 26, 1966 the People's Consultative Congress

(MPRS) moved to end Sukarno's costly Konfrontasi. policy against
Malaysi.a.

This was finally accomplished on August 11, 1966, largely

due to the negotiations of the new Forei.gn Mi.nister, Adam Malik.

The
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endi.ng of the war with Malaysi.a must be considered a major blow to
Sukarno's attempts to re-assert his power.
On July 25, 1966 still another Cabinet shake-up established
the tripartite power structure that endures to the present time.
Suharto was given the powers of head of state, the Sultan of Jogjakarta
would be the First Deputy Prime Minister and Adam Malik, long an
opponent of Sukarnoist ideology, would be the Foreign Minister.
For all intents and purposes, the victory was now complete.
What remained was the future of Sukarno. At this crucial juncture,
Sukarno now made a totally uncharacteristic and ultimately fatal move.
To counteract mounting public pressure, Sukarno attempted to divert
attention from himself to a CIA plot to overthrow him.

(See discus-

sion of the "Gilchrist letter," p. 60.) For the first time, Sukarno
publically took the offensive against the military, claiming military
involvement in the plot.

To check-mate Sukarno's new aggressive

posture, the military on December 21, 1966 came out publically as a
defender

~f

the Constitution and the status quo. This move was meant

to reassure the public of the military's outwardly peaceful intentions
toward Sukarno.

By doing so, the military made Sukarno appear an

aggressive challenger to the New Order of Suharto.
For Sukarno, time had now run out.

He sealed his own fate

in a January 1 O, 1967 statement in which he criticized the leadership
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of the MPRS for failing to recognize the "cunning of neokolim
subversion" that was clouding their investigation of GESTAPU.
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Between January 11 , 1967 and March 12, 1 967, the MPRS
sought to revoke Sukarno's presidential powers.

On January 1, 1967,

Sukarno had given his "answers" to questions regarding his involvement in GESTAPU.

By this time, however, many of the groups in

Indonesian society were extremely wary of hi.s statements.

The out-

lawed student group, KAMI, for example, continued to agitate for
Sukarno's ouster.

He might have been able to weather this crisis

as well had it not been for his statements of January 1 O, 1967 that
convinced the MPRS to act for the "good of the state."

On January 20,

1967, the MPRS opened deliberations on the fate of Sukarno.
In the midst of these discussions, a new element was added
to the drama.

Charging that, "Mr. Sukarno failed to act as indicated

by the law in his position as head of state and Supreme Commander of
the Armed Forces,"
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the Indonesian Supreme Court demanded that

Sukarno be tried for treason on charges of embezzling state funds and
complicity in the coup attempt.

For Sukarno, the end had come.

There was no rhetorical outburst to counter this final challenge.

1°7 New York Times, January 11, 1967, p. 7.
1 0 8 New York Times, February 2, 1967, p. 1.
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On February 20, 1967 President Sukarno officially
surrendered all governing powers to General Suharto in accordance
with MPRS decree #15 of that date.

Meeting on March 12, 1967 the

MPRS legitimized the actions of February 20 and made moves to
institute the New Order of President Suharto.
leadership had finally been resolved.

The crisis in political
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The Trials: A Preliminary Assessment
The vital question is this: how was the military able to
triumph over a seemingly invincible Sukarno? The answer to this
question can be found in the typically Javanese manner employed by
the military in their dealings with Sukarno. The military won out
because it had not tried to form public opinion but only to follow the
"apparent wishes" of the masses.
In formulating its strategy against Sukarno, the military
recognized several basic facts.

The military was aware the PKI and

Sukarno were wedded through the policy of NASOKOM into an unholy
alliance directed at the military. Any action taken against one party
would therefore be viewed as an attack on the other as well.

Second,

Sukarno had implicitly given his blessing to the PKI as his political
heirs.

His statements on the role of Aidit in Indonesian politics

109The texts of these two MPRS statements appear in the
appendix to this paper.
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(seep. 18) as well as his seemingly le~ward dri~ toward the orbit of
Red Chinese influence seemed to confirm this fact.

Third, the military

recognized that the PKI desired to eliminate the military as a political
force in Indonesia and that if the PKI was allowed to continue operati.ans, this situation might become reality.

Paramount, however, was

the military's recognition of Sukarno's immense popularity with the
masses.

It was felt that in a direct confrontation, Sukarno's mass

appeal would be the deciding factor with the military the loser. Thus,
the military was forced into a typically Javanese strategy of attacking
Sukarno through indirect means. To this end, the trials of suspected
participants in GESTAPU played an integral role in the mi.litary's
strategy for the displacement of Sukarno.
The trials served several purposes. They exposed the
corruption and inefficiency that existed in the Indonesian government.
Finally, the glittering image generally associated with the Sukarno
years had been stripped away to reveal a decayed, rotting infrastructure.

No longer could the ultramodern Hotel Indonesia blot out

the tumble-down shacks of Djakarta.

Similiarly, the trials discredited

the PKT and the concept of the Marxist revolution in Indonesia, at least
for the time being.

11

O Within the military itself, the trials provided a

110According to some experts, notably Arnold Brackman,
if the Suharto government cannot make real inroads into the economic
woes of Indonesia, there is a good chance that the PKI may yet succeed.
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rationale for purging its ranks of left-wing military officers by tying
them to the coup attempt.

In doing so, the Indonesian military

reverted, at least temporarily, to its traditional conservative origins.
The trials also served to establish the military as the defender of the
"popular will." By such gestures as the freeing of political prisoners
(see p. 48) the military created the image of the sympathetic public
servant while detracting from Sukarno's image of the "Great Father."
Most importantly, however, the trials undermined and finally
destroyed Sukarno's legitimacy to govern by raising indirect questions
that Sukarno was increasingly unable to answer to the satisfaction of
the majority of groups in Indonesian society. The key word here is
indirect.

In this respect, the trials were an extension of the classic

Javanese mentality.

CHAPTER VII

GESTAPU AND POLITICAL CHANGE

As was stated in the initial chapter of this paper, the
purpose of this research has been to provide a case-study of incidence
of political change in a developing society.
ati.on has been left unanswered, however.

A fundamental consi.derThat i.s, what constitutes

poll.ti.cal change? What symbols, personalities, or i.nsti.tuti.ons must
be manipulated in order for a crisis in political change to be resolved
peacefully (assuming that thi.s is the desired goal).

This final chapter

will explore these questions and attempt to place into perspective the
events i.n I ndonesi.a from October 1 , 1965 to March 12, 1967.

Poli.ti.cal Change i.n Traditional Societies
In a traditional society, the instruments of governing are
highly visible to the average ci.ti.zen.

The institutions of governing

have evolved over a long period of time and have had their legitimacy
inculcated into the value systems of the governed.
simple, uncomplicated process.

It is a relatively

A king or some other princely

personality fulfills the executive function.

Presumably, this i.ndi.vi.dual

rules with the di.vine approval of a deity that oversees the operations
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of mortal men on earth.

O~

times, the ruler i.s the physical

manifestation of this supernatural being placed on earth.

His words

are law and his every action is deemed legitimate because of his
exalted, pre-eminent position in society.

Likewise, the legislative

and judicial functions may be centered in a "council of elders" that
has the same aura of legitimacy as the ruler.

Indeed, in some tradi-

tional societies, all three functions may be centered in one institution,
the ruler, thus creating a primitive form of autocracy.
societies, the insti.tuti.ons of power are well defined.

In such

Likewise, the

question of political change is a relatively simple one. The ruler di.es
and is supplanted by another who inherits the mantle of legitimacy
from his predecessor.

Even when confl i.ct among pretenders does

occur, it is usually confined to a small group of individuals, each with
a varying interpretation of how the problem should be resolved.

No

matter who wins in such a situation, the mantle of legitimacy is kept
relatively intact.

Tradition has dictated the answer to the problem.

Political Change in Developed Societies
In a developed political system, political legitimacy is
equally well defined.

Constitutions, the manifestation of the Greek

and Judeo-Christi.an traditions in government, spell out specifically
the institutions that subsume political authority. Where the traditional
system i.s diverse, the mature political system may be characterized
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as specific.

Developed political systems resolve conflict through

socially acceptable channels.

In democratic settings, candidates

contest electoral positions, commissions and boards fill non-elective
vacancies.

In authoritarian systems, the selection process, while

not as open as in a democratic society, is closely regulated by
institutions of government to insure their smooth operations.

In any

developed political process there are standards of behavior required
for any potential participant in the process. Any person exhibiting
deviant behavior outside the accepted limits is considered an outcast
to be excluded from participation.

In such a manner the mature

political system is able to insure its own perpetuity.

Politi.cal Change in Developing Societies
Transitional societies, such as those that achieved their
independence after World War II do not fit into either of the aforementioned categories.

Indeed, life in a society torn between the

security of the past and the promise of the future may be the most
complex of all.

Men do not willingly part with the past.

Yet the

model of development stands as a dream to be realized in order to
be recognized as a world power.

One will note no underdeveloped

societies (with the possible exception of the People's Republic of
China) that would classify as a world leader. Western political
scientists have deemed the Western, industrialized model to be the
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yardstick by which all states are measured.

Those that fall short wish

to catch up as quickly as possible, no matter what the cost involved.
Just as social discontinuity in a transitional society can
create a psychological dilemma for the average citizen, so also does
a conflict in matters political. The transitional political process is
uniquely unequipped to deal with society's massive problems. The
lure of the past and the promise of the future create a political environment incapable of achieving anything but the most trivial goals.
Ancient symbols and institutions do not appear to have legitimacy in
the space age.

Likewise, the average citizen is so tied to the past

that to attempt a break wi.th that past would create a psychological
dichotomy so severe that one must question the worthiness of even
trying. Thus, the society may well stagnate or even possibly regress,
creating in the m-eantime even more seemingly insurmountable
obstacles.
The key to the problems of a transitional society is how
political conflict is resolved.

Drawing on a colonial mentality

(particularly the Anglo-American tradition), the leaders of developing
societies have learned that "participation" is central to a mature
political process. Yet the institutions of governing they employ are
not capable of handling the complex action of "choosing." Traditional
ideology had always looked to the deity to supply political leadership.
It was a process that excluded mortal men from participation.
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Developed societies, on the other hand, have the trappings of
government (legislature, judicial systems, executives, constitutions)
to solve a crisis in political leadership.

One needs only to consult

the proper statute to find the answer.
Transitional societies enjoy neither the mysticism of the
past or the precision of the future.

While power is present in various

forms (charismatic leaders, political parties, interest groups, the
military), legitimacy is

o~en

institutions of government.

not congruent with the recognized

Hence, transitional societies are caught

up in a seemingly impossible situation of trying to resolve conflict in
an environment that lacks the institutions to do so. This is precisely
the contention of this research; that Indonesia, as a transitional
society, was not able to resolve its crisis in political leadership
because the institutions and symbols of power in Indonesia lacked
legitimacy in the eyes of the average citizen.

Political authority did

not spring from the recognized organs of government.

It came from

elsewhere (the military, the PKI, and the personality of Sukarno).
The remainder of this chapter will examine this contention as it
applies to Indonesia and attempt to draw some conclusions about
the significance of the Indonesian experience for other developing
societies.
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Indonesia: A Typical Developing Society
The roots of contemporary Indonesian society run deep into
its Javanese past.

Throughout Indonesia one can find proud references

to ancient Javanese empires that exerted a major influence over much
of sea-girt Southeast Asia.

Principal among these empires was the

Mataram dynasty of the early seventeenth century.

Early in the

history of the Mataram period, the Sultan Agung restored the political
unity of Java in a series of devastating campaigns that established the
imperial capital near present day Jogjakarta.

The political structure

in Mataram ti.mes began and ended with the absolute authority.

Since

Mataram was an Islamic state, the king, while no longer explicitly a
god-king, was still a sacral figure.

According to legend, the ruler

could be recognized by the wahyu (di.vine light) that either descended
upon him or shone from his eyes.

When the wahyu

le~

the king, it

was considered that his legitimacy to govern had been revoked.
The early Javanese princes were obliged to fulfill certain
functions in Mataram society.

Basically, it was the ruler's solemn

responsibility to maintain natural order in the kingdom, encompassing
and reconciling any disturbances should they occur. That these functions were held in high esteem in early Javanese society is indicated
by several of the titles given the Mataram princes: Hamengku Buwono
("He who holds the world on his lap") and Paku Buwono ("Axis of the
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world").

Thus, it was the ruler who became the physical manifestation

of power and political authority in ancient Indonesia.
In many ways, Sukarno must be considered as the 20th
century reincarnation of the Mataram princes.

As Bernhard Dahm

has pointed out, much of Bung Karno's personality was inherently
Javanese. 111

Dahm fi.rst considers Sukarno's underlying belief in

a cyclical view of history in which Indonesia's rulers are simply
temporary phenomenon.

This unique view of history implies an

"inevitable" ending in which Indonesia's ruler was to be a Just Savior
(Ratu Adil) who would establish a flourishing kingdom, bestowing upon
its inhabitants prosperity, freedom from taxation, and houses built of
stone.

Such a prophecy came from the Djajabja tales of the Mataram

period of which all Javanese youth are acutely cognizant.

It is Dahm's

contention that Sukarno felt himself to be the Ratu Adi.I of the anci.ent
tales.

112

The fact that the prophecies told of a savior only lent

credence to Sukarno's rationalization of his personal life-style as
hi.s just due.
Javanism was also at the base of Sukarno's ability to
combine, synthesize, and submerge divergent, sometimes even

111 Bernhard Dahm, Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian
Independence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), p. vi.
112Ib'd
1 •

,

p.

Vl..1.
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opposite positions and groups into a curious unity of his own creation.
Such a disavowal of conflict i.s deeply embedded i.n Javanese cultural
traditions.

Indeed, a basic core value of Indonesian society is con-

formity orientation.

Indonesians as a whole have a high affiliation

need, like to please each other and do not like to openly hurt other's
feelings.

In addition, Indonesian society is strongly deferential to

the senior partner i.n any hierarchical relationship.

Thus, it was in

thi.s manner that Sukarno was able to rationalize his unholy alliance
of the PKI and the military in the days before GESTAPU.

While out-

siders might have viewed the alliance as potentially explosive, in
Sukarno's own mind, it was simply the result of the natural course
of events.

In the long run, it was his farsightedness that would prove

fatal.
To this deep-seated Javanism, Dahm adds a third factor:
Sukarno's unbending devotion to his conception of what was right for
Indonesia.

It must be remembered that at no time did Sukarno ever

openly seek self-aggrandizement. To his own way of thinking, every
rupiah spent in Indonesia was money spent for the glorification of the
state and its people.

His speeches redound with praise for the masses

and their struggles to achieve a better way of life.

He honestly felt

that the actions he took were beneficial to the masses of Indonesia.
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Yet he was so far from reality in his actions. As Dahm
comments,
There is a tragic greatness in a man so possessed of his
own rightness and self-righteousness, so impervious to the
harsh truths of Indonesian political life. From his earliest
days as a political activist, Sukarno insisted that nationalism,
Marxism, and Islam were one. And so, in a sense, they or
rather what he assumed and proclaimed each of them to be,
were by his own Javanese light. 113
Just as the wahyu shone down on the ancient Mataram princes, so in
his own convictions, did it reflect on Sukarno. And, just as the
extinguishing of the light signaled the end of the princes reign, so
also with Sukarno, Great Leader of the Revolution.
In the opening chapter of this essay it was stated that the
research would not concern itself only with the events in Indonesia
but also the larger question of political change in developing societies.
It would appear that some assessment of the significance of the
Indonesian experience would be in order. The questions are these:
What are the lessons of GESTAPU and its

a~ermath?

More

specifically, what is the significance of the displacement of Sukarno
for students of developing societies? Finally, can the Indonesian
experience provide new insights into the problem of political change
in developing societies? The conclusion to this essay will address
itself to these important considerations.

113 Ibid., p. viii.
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The Indonesian experience once again reaffirmed the fact
that political change does not occur within a vacuum with all the
variables clearly identified and understood.

Indeed, the events in

Indonesia showed the definite need to explore and comprehend the
socio-cultural environment from which the political system evolved.
Indonesia's political system developed for specific reasons unique to
its cultural heritage.

If the researcher truly wants to get an accurate

picture of any society, he must be aware that cultural patterns do
play an important role in the politics of that society.

For Indonesia,

the primary consideration was the central role of Java in the contemporary environment.

It was the awareness of this cultural heritage

that influenced all the agents in the drama of political change that
unfolded after September 30 -October 1, 1965.

It is not surprising

to learn that both of the major actors i.n the Indonesian scenario
(Sukarno and Suharto) were extremely conscious of their Javanese
backgrounds. Whatever the case, GESTAPU has proved the need to
study all aspects of a social situation when attempting to comprehend
bios politicos.
GESTAPU also proved that even in the most authoritarian
settings, the masses do play a significant role in establishing and
maintaining the legitimacy of the political leadership. When the mood
of the masses was favorable to him, Sukarno was widely praised and
supported.

However, as the revelations of political intrigue were
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made public by the trials, the mood of the masses began to change
until their support was withdrawn altogether in March, 1967. The
ability to recognize the mood of "the people" and to act in accordance
with their wishes is a difficult political task indeed.
Sukarno had become so involved in manipulating the symbols
of power that he lost sight of their purpose: to insure the best possible
environment for as many citizens as possible by shielding them from
the excesses of government.

He saw political legitimacy not as a

rational tool to be used in aiding the masses but as an emotional
instrument to feed his self-image.
Sukarno failed to recognize the
regarded their government.

By losing sight of his authority,

shi~ing

mood of his subjects as they

Worse yet, when he did finally recognize

the people's true sentiments, he failed to readjust his strategies to
accommodate the new situation.

Instead of coming down to the level

of his citizens, Sukarno sought to wrap himself in the aura of psuedolegitimacy that his symbols of power had created for him.
coming closer, Sukarno retreated.

Instead of

In contrast, Suharto was able to

measure this sentiment of the people. This ability to properly analyze
the situation was the decisive factor in alleviating Indonesia's crisis
in political leadership.
Similarly, the events in Indonesia teach the need to be
persistent but patient in attempting to resolve a crisis in political
leadership. The military knew that an open challenge to Sukarno's
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legitimacy in the early post-GESTAPU days would have ended i.n their
defeat because of Sukarno's pre-eminent position in Indonesian society.
Even while many of the politically elite groups in Indonesia had suffered
under the repressive reign of Sukarno's rule, there was still a tendency
to prefer him over a military, that at least in their minds, had seized
the symbols of legitimacy without just cause and was now proceeding
to create a new legitimacy by perverting the old insti.tuti.ons for their
own ends.

Even though Sukarno had suppressed them, the political

elite still felt a sense of commonality with him; they were all politicians.

Such a sense of "oneness" was missing when the military

assumed effective control of the political system. To the political
elite, the military was a curious interloper who sought to use their
monopoly of weapons to create an unnatural state of affairs.
Accordingly, the military conceded Sukarno's dominance in
those first days and were willing to bide their ti.me until such an opportunity to directly confront him was feasible.

Yet the military did not

sit idly by while Sukarno gained even greater legitimacy.

In the days

after GESTAPU the military tacitly approved the student attacks on
Sukarno by failing to control the cro\NCls, claiming a lack of authority
to do so. This i.n turn forced Sukarno to give them the necessary
power to cope with the situation.

In addition, the military used

indirect means (i.e., the trials) to undermine Sukarno's legitimacy
to govern. As a result, when the ti.me for confrontation arrived, the
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military had garnered enough support to displace the President.
There is little doubt that if the military had tri.ed to force Sukarno
from office immediately
in their attempt.

a~er

GESTAPU that they would have failed

Doing so would have simply established the i.mage

of Sukarno as the symbol of the consti.tuti.onally legal order bei.ng
supplanted by a dissident military.

By exercising restrai.nt and dis-

cretion, the mi.li.tary allowed Sukarno to undermine his own position,
thereby making the transfer of political authority a desi.rable and
necessary action.

Sukarno was made to appear the aggressor, not

the military. The implication of the Indonesian experience is clear:
do not try to challenge legitimacy with illegitimacy.

Symbolic

manifestations of authority make an indelible imprint on a man's
mind.

Use the symbols of authority when confronting authority.

not challenge simply to challenge.
to create an aura of legitimacy.

Do

Manipulate the established symbols

Only in this manner will the dis-

placement of a government be acceptable to its constituents.
The final lesson of the Indonesian experience is an obvious
one:

no leader is invincible to political change.

No matter how

charismatic or dogmatic a political figure may be, he is still ultimately
accountable to his constituents in one way or another.

Sukarno --

Bung Karno, Great Father of the Revolution, President for Life -- how
secure and inscrutable he appeared to be. Yet, perhaps it was this
state of mind that brought about his demise.

Perhaps Sukarno had
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grown too complacent in his relationship with his people.

Perhaps he

had allowed himself to become isolated from the true feelings of the
society in whose name he governed.

Indeed, perhaps Sukarno

believed that he was the Ratu Adil of the ancient Javanese prophecies.
One thing is certain, however.

The winds of political change were

blowing in Indonesia after October 1, 1965. One man (Suharto) was
able to accurately gauge its intensity. Another man (Sukarno) was
not.

Whether "Pak Harto" and his New Order will succeed is still

unclear at this point.

Only time will tell the answer.

r
POSTSCRIPT

General Suharto has sought to create a broad basis of
support throughout Indonesian society since assuming power in the
wake of GESTAPU. A major blot on his record, however, has been
the government's inability (or unwillingness) to rehabilitate the
associates of the coup participants. As a result, this failure at
reconstruction has caused some segments of Indonesian society to
doubt the validity and sincerity of President Suharto's proposed Orba
(New Order).
As late as June, 1970 many of the minor participants of
the coup attempt were still being detained by the government.

The

majority of the prisoners were being held as members, supporters,
or "associates" of the outlawed PKI. Amnesty International reported
in 1970 that there were 116,000 political prisoners still being held in
Indonesia. 114 The Indonesian government responded to this charge

1 14 Herbert Feith, "Indonesia: Blot on the New Order,"
New Republic 15 (April 13, 1968), p. 17.
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by saying that the figure was closer to 55,000. The exact figure will
probably never be known. 115
The detainees are classified into three general categories:
Group A

includes the hard-core prisoners, those
reportedly incapable of rehabilitation.

Group B

prisoners are those whose fates have not yet
been decided by the mi.l itary tribunals hearing
their appeals.

Group C

individuals are those whose involvement in
GESTAPU has been proven but whom the government views as minimum security risks.

The overwhelming majority of those persons now incarcerated are
classified in the Group C category.
The conditions in the camps are extremely poor.

Prisoners

constantly suffer from cruelty and harassment at the hands of the
military guards.

More importantly, the prisoners suffer from a

chronic lack of food and medical facilities.

O~en,

prisoners receive

nothing more than a thin gruel of wheat and a few stalks of bajem
(spinach) once a day.

In spite of the bad conditions, however, most
-~

115

In recent years, the issue of the prisoners has become
a dead letter. Interviews with government officials provide no new
insights into the future plans for rehabilitation or even the number of
persons still being held.
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prisoners maintain a high sense of self-respect.

In the long run, this

sense of personal worth may prove to be decisive in light of their
extreme deprivation.
The prospects for the release of these prisoners is not
bright at the present time.

For one thing, there exists a great fear

on the part of the government that if these prisoners were released
into the general society, they might attempt to reorganize the PKI.
As one government official has stated, "We have learned that it does
not pay to be lenient. These communists are acting docile now, but
they are sly and they are clever. 11116 As long as attitudes such as
this prevail, it does not appear that release will be forthcoming.
There is also apprehension as to how the general populace
would accept these former PKI intimates.

Many Indonesians still

harbor great animosity toward the PKI because of the post-GESTAPU
purges. As one young man, whose brother was killed by the PKI has
said, "I know who did it.

I am waiting for them to come back.

communists come back to

OU r

If the

town, we Will have to ki 11 them . 11 l l ?

Comments like this are heard throughout Indonesia.

116Ibid. , p. 19.
117New York Times, November 16, 1969, p. 4.
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In August, 1969 the Indonesian government outlined a plan
to send 2,500 Group C prisoners and their families to the deserted
island of Buru.

By the end of 1971, however, less than 1,000

detainees had been relocated.

It appears at this time that the

problem of the political prisoners will remain a major blemish on
the image of Suharto's "New Order" for many years to come.
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APPENDIX

APPENDIX

DECREE NO. 1
ON THE FORMATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY
COUNCIL OF INDONESIA

I.

For the sake of the safety of the State of the Republic of Indonesia,
for the sake of safeguarding implementation of Pantjasila and the
whole of the Pantja Azimat of the Revolution, for the sake of the
safety of the Army and of the Armed Services in general, in the
middle of the night of Thursday, 30th September 1965, a cleaningup operation was carried out in the Capital of the Republic of
Indonesia, Djarkarta, against members of the self-styled Council
of Generals, which had planned a Coup just before Armed Forces
Day on 5th October 1965. A number of Generals have been
arrested, the means of communication and the other vital objects
in the Capital have fallen fully into the power of the 30th September
Movement. The 30th September Movement is a movement solely
confined to the body of the Army to put an end to the arbitrary
deeds of the Generals who are Members of the Council of Generals
and of the other officers who are accomplices and sympathisers of
the Council of Generals. This Movement is assisted by armed
troops outside the Army.

II.

In order to facilitate follow-up activities of the 30th September
1965 action, the Leadership of the 30th September Movement will
form the Revolutionary Council of Indonesia, the members of which
will be composed of civilians and military persons who support the
30th September Movement without reserve. For the time being,
pending general elections for the Madjeli.s Permusjaratan Rakjat
in conformity with the 1945 Constitution, the Revolutionary Council
of Indonesia is the source of all authority in the state of the
Republic of Indonesia. The Revolutionary Council is the instrument for the whole of the Indonesian nation to realize Pantja Si.la
and the whole of the Pantja Azimat of the Revolution. The
Revolutionary Council of Indonesia will be represented in its dayto-day activities by the Presidium of the Council, which will be
composed of the Commander and the Deputy Commanders of the
30th September Movement.
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III.

With the falling of all the authority of the State to the Revolutionary
Council of Indonesia, the Dwikora Cabinet automatically has the
status of being decommissioned. Until the formation of a new
Cabinet by the Revolutionary Council of Indonesia, the former
Ministers have the obligation to carry out routine tasks, to guard
orderliness in their respective Departments, are forbidden to
appoint new civil servants and are forbidden to take steps that can
have wide-spread consequences. All former Ministers are obliged
to account for their responsibilities to the Revolutionary Council of
Indonesia and specifically to the new Ministers who will be appointed
by the Revolutionary Council of Indonesia.

IV.

As the regional instruments of the Revolutionary Council of
Indonesia, Provincial Revolutionary Councils (maxi.mum of 25
persons), Kabupaten Revolutionary Councils (maximum 15 persons),
Ketjamatan Revolutionary Councils (maximum 10 persons) and
Village Revolutionary Councils (maximum 7 persons) will be set up,
composed of civilians and military persons who support the 30th
September Movement without reserve. These Regional Revolutionary Councils are the highest authority for the region concerned,
and the work of those in the Provinces and Kabupaten will be
assisted by their respective Day-to-Day Administrative Bodies,
whi. lst those in the Ketjamatan and the Villages will be assisted by
the leaders of the local branch of the National Front who are persons
supporting the 30th September Movement without reserve.

V.

The Presidium of the Revolutionary Council of Indonesia consists
of the Commander and the Deputy Commanders of the 30th September
Movement. The Commander and Deputy Commanders of the 30th
September Movement are the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen of the
Revolutionary Council of Indonesia.

VI.

Immediately after the formation of the Regional Revolutionary
Councils, the Chairmen of the relevant Revolutionary Councils must
report to the Revolutionary Council of the next higher level as to
the complete composition of the membership of the Council.
Provincial Revolutionary Councils must obtain written ratification
from the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council of Indonesia.
Kabupaten Revolutionary Councils must obtain written ratification
from the Provincial Revolutionary Council, and the Ketjamatan and
Village Revolutionary Councils must obtain written ratification from
the Kabupaten Revo luti.onary Councils .
Djakarta, 1st October 1965
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THE 30th SEPTEMBER MOVEMENT COMMAND

Commander:

Lt-Colonel Untung.

Deputy Commander:

Brig-General Supardjo.

Deputy Commander:

Air Lt-Colonel Heru.

Deputy Commander:

Sea Co lone l Sunardi •

Deputy Commander:

Adjunct Senior Commissioner of
Pol ice Anwas •

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
ANNOUNCEMENT (OCTOBER 1, 1965)

We, the President/Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces of the Republic of Indonesia/Great Leader of the Indonesian
Revolution announce the following:
1.

We, the President/Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces/
Great Leader of the Revolution herewith announce: That I am in
good health and that I continue exercising the State-leadership,
and leading the Revolution. That temporarily, the leadership of
the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia is directly in the
hands of the President/Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces of the Republic of Indonesia.
That in order to implement the daily tasks within the Army,
Major General of the Army, Pranoto Reksosamudro, 3rd
Assistant to the Minister/Army Chief, has been temporarily
appointed.

2.

To the entire Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia, I order
to again increase their vigilance and to remain at their respective
posts and only move on orders.

3.

I order to the entire People to remain calm, to increase their
vigilance and to maintain their National oneness and unity as
compact as possible.
Djakarta, October 1, 1965
PRESIDENT /SUPREME COMMANDER/GREAT LEADER
OF THE REVOLUTION/MANDATARY OF THE MPRS
sgd.
SUKARNO
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
ANNOUNCEMENT NO. 002/PENG/PUS/1965

It is hereby announced that:
1.

An understanding, cooperation and determination has been
resulted by the Army, Navy and the Police Force to overcome
the counter-revolutionary deeds committed by a movement cal led
"Gerakan 30 September" (September-30 Movement).

2.

By establishing what they call "The Indonesian Revolutionary
Council" and by declaring the DWIKORA Cabinet as demissionary,
it became obvious that they are counter-revolutionaries committing a coup against the President/Great Leader of the Revolution
and having kidnapped several high-ranking Army Officers.

3.

The public is asked to be calm, alert and watchful.
Djakarta, October 1, 1965
TEMPORARY ARMY LEADERSHIP
sgd.
SOEHARTO
Major General of the Army

127

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
ANNOUNCEMENT NO. 027 /PENG/PUS/1965

1.

On October 1, 1965, things happened in Djakarta as the result of
a counter-revolutionary action calling themselves "September 30
Movement";

2.

They kidnapped the following high ranking officers of the Army:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Lieutenant General A. Yani;
Major General Suprapto;
Major General S. Parman;
Major General Harjono M. T.;
Brigadier General D. I. Pandjaitan;
Bri.gadi.er General Sutojo Siswomihardjo.

3.

They had been able to force and use the R.R. I. (Radio Republi.k
Indonesia) and the Head Office of Telecommunications;

4.

President Sukarno and the Minister of Defense and Security,
General A.H. Nasution, were safe and sound;

5.

The Army's leadership is in the hands of Major General Soeharto
for the ti.me being.

6.

The general situation had been controlled and security measures
were still being taken. The public is asked to remain calm and
do their dai.ly tasks as usual.
Djakarta, October 1, 1965
TEMPORARY ARMY LEADERSHIP
sgd.
SOEHARTO
Major General of the Army
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PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
ORDER (FEBRUARY 20, 1967)

I.

II.

III.

Considering:
1•

This present stage of the Revolution, and the national and
international political situation as well;

2.

The Order of the Day of the Supreme Commander of the
Armed Forces/President/Great Leader of the Revolution,
on March 8, 1966;

In View of:
1.

The necessity to create an atmosphere of calm and stability
for the Government, and the course of the Revolution.

2.

It is deemed necessary to guarantee the oneness between
the Great Leader of the Revolution, the Armed Forces and
the People, in order to maintain the authority and the
leadership of the President/Supreme Commander/Great
Leader of the Revolution and all his teachings.

Has resolved/ordered:
To order: Lieutenant General Soeharto, Minister/Commander
in Chief of the Army, on behalf of the President/Supreme
Commander/Great Leader of the Revolution:
To take all necessary steps to guarantee security and calm
and the stability of the running of the Government and the
course of the Revolution, while securing the personal safety
of and the authority of the Great Leader of the Revolution.
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IV. To convey this announcement with fullest sense of responsibility,
to the entire People of Indonesia and to the MPRS. May God
Almighty protect the People of Indonesia in implementing their
ideals in realizing a just and prosperous society, based on
Pantja Si la.
Djakarta, February 20, 1967
PRESIDENT/SUPREME COMMANDER/GREAT LEADER
OF THE REVOLUTION/MANDATARY OF MPRS
sgd.
SUKARNO

PROVISIONAL CONSULTATIVE PEOPLE'S CONGRESS
OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
DECREE NO. XXXIII/MPRS/1 967

Considering:
a.

That the address entitled "Nawaksara" as a whole, that was
delivered by the President/Mandatary of MPRS to the MPRS
on 22nd June 1966 and the letter of the President/Mandatary
of MPRS, No. 01 /Pres/1967 of 10th January concerning the
Supplement to the "Nawaksara" address, falls short of
fulfilling the hopes of the people in general and especially the
members of the MPRS, since it does not clearly contain and
account for responsibility as to the policy of the President in
regard to the counter-revolutionary rebellion of the
"September 30 Movement"/PKI and its epilogue, the economic
deterioration and decline of morals;

b.

That the President/Mandatary of MPRS has transferred the
power of Government to the Executor of MPRS Decree No.
IX/MPRS/1966 as laid down in the announcement of the
President/Mandatary of MPRS on 20th February 1967;

c.

That, based on the written Report of the Commander of the
Command for the Restoration of Order and Security/Executor
of MPRS Decree No. IX/MPRS/1966 in his letter No. :R-032/
1967 on 1st February 1967, supplemented with the report before
the Special Session of the MPRS on 7th March 1967, the MPRS
is of the opinion that there are indications that President Sukarno
has conducted a policy which indirectly benefi.tted the
"September 30 Movement"/PKI and has given protection to
leaders of the ''September 30 Movement"/PKI;

In View of:
1•

The DPR-GR Resolution and Memorandum of 9th and 23rd
February 1967;

2.

The address of the Chairman of the MPRS at the opening session
of the Special Session of the MPRS 1967;
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3.

The address of the Chairman of the DPR-GR at the opening session
of the Special Session of the MPRS;

4.

The Government Statement before the DPR-GR on the 4th of March
1967;

5.

The address-report of the Commander of the Command for the
Restoration of Order and Security/Executor of MPRS Decree No.
IX/MPRS/1966 before the Special Session of the MPRS, on 7th
March 1967.

With due regard to:
1•

The Preamble to the 1945 Constitution, the 1945 Constitution and
its Elucidation;

2.

Decision of the Leadership of the MPRS No. 13/B/1967 concerning
the rejection of the Supplement to the "Nawaksara" address.

Having heard:
The deliberation at the Special Session of MPRS from 7th March
to 12th March 1967 inclusive.
Has resolved:
To decree:
The Decree concerning the Revocation of Government Power from
President Sukarno.

133

CHAPTER I
Article 1
Declare that President Sukarno has not fulfilled his
constitutional obligations as a good Mandatary ought to do towards
the MPRS which has given hi.m the mandate as stipulated in the 1945
Constitution.
Article 2
Declare that President Sukarno has not executed the policy
of the State and the Decrees of the MPRS, as a good Mandatary is
obliged to do towards the MPRS which has given him the mandate
as provided for by the 1945 Constitution.
Article 3
To prohibit President Sukarno from conducting political
activities till the general elections and, as from the coming
into effect of this Decision, to revoke the MPRS mandate from
President Sukarno and all powers of Government as stipulated in
the 1 945 Constitution.
Article 4
To sanction the coming into effect of MPRS Decree No.
XV /MPRS/1966, and to appoint General Soeharto, Executor of
MPRS Decree No. IX/MPRS/1966, as Acting President based
on Article 8 of the 1945 Constitution, until the election of a new
President by the Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat as a result of
general elections.
Article 5
The Acting President shall obey and is responsible to the
Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat (Sementara).
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CHAPTER II
Article 6
Decide that the further judicial settlement which concerns
Dr. Ir. Sukarno be implemented i.n accordance with the stipulations
of Law i.n the context of upholding law and justice; entrust its implementation to the Acting President.

CHAPTER III
Article 7
This Decree comes into effect at the date of its sanctioning
and shall have retroactive force as from 22nd February 1967.
Decreed at:
On

Djakarta
March 12, 1967

PROVISIONAL MADJELIS PERMUSJAWARATAN RAKJAT
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
Chairman
sgd.
Dr. A.H. NASUTION
General of the Army
Vice Chairman
sgd.
OSA MALIK!

Vice Chairman
sgd.
H.M. SUBCHAN Z.E.

Vice Chairman
sgd.
M. SIREGAR

Vice Chairman
sgd.
MASHUDI
Major General of the Army
Clari Fi.cation

The power of Government as meant here is understood to mean
as is stipulated in the 1945 Constitution and its Elucidation, so that in
accordance with mentioned stipulations, President Sukarno has been
substituted by General Soeharto, Executor of MPRS Decree No.
IX/MPRS/1966 as Acting President.
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